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The first essay studies the Marginal Cost of Funds in the existence of tax
evasion. We develop a general equilibrium model of tax evasion, including the
expected utility of taxpayers and three different revenue-raising government
policies. In this rich model environment, we analytically derive the marginal
cost of funds (MCF) for the alternative policy instruments. We consider two
main fiscal reforms: the revision in the nonlinear tax scheme and the changes
in enforcement mechanism (the audit and penalty rates). First, we derive the
MCF for the tax reform and find its key determinants. The derived MCF is
greater than the previous ones since it includes a “risk-bearing cost” as well
as tax distortion. The reform in enforcement mechanism generates MCFs in
different forms. Two more MCFs with respect to audit and penalty rates
are presented. Finally, we compare these three different MCFs in numerical
example and provide some policy implications.
vi
The second essay explores optimal tax structure in the presence of sta-
tus effect. When the consumption of certain goods affects one’s social status,
this externality creates two opposite effects in a society. Seeking higher status
through “positional goods” gives individuals much incentive to suppy labor but
still allocates income for less “nonpositional goods” as well. In this case, differ-
ential taxes on positional goods work as corrective instruments to internalize
the social cost stemming from status seeking. Furthermore, the differential
taxes generate revenue that can be used to alleviate preexisting income tax
distortion. Thus, the differential taxes on positional goods could give so called
“double dividend.” I develop a game-theoretic model in which each individual
with a different labor productivity unknown to the others engages in a status-
seeking game, and the government has a revenue requirement. Then I show
that, under a condition in which utility is separable between positional goods
and leisure, a revenue-neutral shift in the tax mix away from nonlinear income
taxes towards positional-good taxes enhances welfare. Hence, the differential
taxes on positional goods are necessary together with the nonlinear income
taxes for an optimal tax structure.
The third essay explores the impact of increasing capital mobility on
regional growth and environment. I develop an endogenous growth model in
which each local government competes against the others, to induce imper-
fectly mobile stock of capital into its region. Then I show that an increase
in capital mobility generates “tax importing” due to which each locality ex-
periences a higher growth rate and more degraded environment. That is, the
vii
increasing mobility dampens the capital tax and transfers the burden of pollu-
tion abatement to the locality. This finding supports the hypothesis of “race
to the bottom” in environmental standards. Identifying a reduction in over-
all welfare of residents, I consider two alternative federal interventions in the
model: uniform environmental standard and requirement of lump sum transfer
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Chapter 1
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in the
Presence of Tax Evasion
1.1 Introduction
To fund unexpected public expenses or new public projects, a govern-
ment usually imposes additional distortionary taxes such as labor or capital
income taxes even though the higher tax liabilities could stimulate taxpayers
to cheat the government. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United
States reports that the estimate of income tax liabilities not collected for 2001
is about 17%, which translates into $345 billion.1 For cases in most other
countries, the estimates are even higher. In 2003, the income tax evasion was
around 25% in France and 30% in the United Kingdom.2 Taxpayers can reduce
the burden of complying with tax liability by underreporting income, whereas
they have the risk of being caught in evasion which generates another welfare
cost. Therefore, when a government levies distortionary taxes for public funds,
the tax evasion itself matters. Taxpayers may or may not have excess burden
through the behavior of tax evasion. However, the taxpayers are assumed to
pay their tax liabilities fully in most economic analyses for evaluating public
1See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury (2006).
2See Christie and Holzner (2006) for more detailed discussion.
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projects, even though the whole revenue from the tax liabilities is not collected
in practice.
For the purpose of evaluating the public expenditures, a related litera-
ture employs a widely known concept of marginal cost of public funds (MCF),
which measures the direct tax burden plus the marginal welfare cost from
raising additional tax revenues.3 However, including the prominent works of
Browning (1976, 1987), almost all subsequent research does not reflect the
aspects of tax evasion in MCF calculation. Even though Mayshar (1991) ana-
lytically measures the MCF for nonlinear income tax in a general equilibrium
model, he does not incorporate the tax evasion as a behavioral response to a
tax change. As noted by Yitzhaki (1987), the existence of tax evasion produces
a risk-bearing cost in another form of excess burden. Nevertheless, he does
not measure the MCF in the presence of tax evasion.4
Our purpose in this paper is to measure MCFs for alternative revenue-
raising policies analytically when the tax evasion matters. In order to do so,
we develop an analytical general equilibrium model in which taxpayers have
an expected utility function, and a government imposes nonlinear income tax,
audit, and fine rates, to fund public goods and lump-sum transfers.5 Since
3See Browning (1976) and Mayshar (1991) for the definition of MCF. This concept orig-
inates in the argument of Pigou (1947).
4Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996, 2002) mention possible ways to incorporate tax evasion
into the calculation of marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF) very broadly but do not
present any analytical model, so they do not derive the MECF (or MCF) as a function of
easily observable exogenous parameters.
5We extend a standard partial equilibrium model of tax evasion such as is presented in
Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
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distortionary taxes are the main instruments for public funds, it is important
to know welfare cost to the use of income tax in the presence of tax evasion.
Using a cost-benefit framework as presented in Mayshar (1991), we derive
a “modified” MCF for nonlinear income tax (MCFT) in the context of tax
evasion and then identify as the key determinants the expected return and
variance of $1 evaded, which consist of only audit and fine rates, implying
the “riskiness of tax evasion.”6 On the other hand, a government audits more
taxpayers or puts higher penalties on tax evaders to increase compliance and
raise public funds.7 Hence, we derive MCF for audit (MCFp) and MCF for
fine (MCFθ) once more to examine welfare cost of tax enforcement policies.
The remains of this work provide numerical examples of MCFs for policy
recommendation for the U.S. economy.
The main contribution of this paper is to present exact MCFs that
are applicable to practical use as analytic formulae. To measure MCFT ana-
lytically, we endogenize the behavior of tax evasion in a model closer to the
actual tax environment. This analysis is not limited to the labor-leisure choice
problems as used in Browning (1976, 1987), Dreze and Stern (1990), Mayshar
(1991), and Ballard and Fullerton (1992) but take actual taxpayer behaviors
into account. Taxpayers mitigate the burden of tax compliance by evading
tax while they bear a risk cost of being caught. The model of this paper
6The MCFT includes tax enforcement policies as newly important parameters that the
previous works with no tax evasion do not identify.
7Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) recognize that audit or penalty rates can be used to raise
revenue when the tax evasion is present in a model and state that it is optimal to equalize
marginal costs of raising revenue for the two alternatives at the margin.
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considers not only tax distortion of labor supply but also risk-bearing cost of
tax evasion, to derives MCFT in a general version of those in a number of
papers as listed above that do ignore tax evasion. Thus, the MCFT becomes
an exact measure for evaluating public expenditures. In addition, resting on
the rich model environment in this paper, we obtain MCFp and MCFθ. The
two analytic formulae together with MCFT allow ones to compare the alter-
native revenue-raising policies on efficiency grounds. To our knowledge, this
analysis is the first attempt on such a policy comparison. Therefore, the set
of MCFT, MCFp, and MCFθ provides a criterion for evaluating alternative
revenue-raising policies for a given level of public funds. Consequently, this
paper fills the gap between the literatures on MCF and on tax evasion.
It is shown analytically that MCFT is greater with tax evasion than with
no tax evasion. This is due to the riskiness of tax evasion that tax enforcement
policies (audit and fine rate) introduce. If the tax evasion exists, an increase
in income tax rate raises both tax distortion of labor supply and riskiness of
tax evasion, stimulating less labor supply but more tax evasion. When the
tax evasion does not matter, an increase in income tax rate raises only the
tax distortion of labor supply, however. The MCFT with no tax evasion is
the same as in Mayshar (1991). In this sense, this paper extends Mayshar’s
MCFT exactly to the tax evasion case. By using the parameter values that
Stuart (1984) suggests for the U.S. economy and finding proper values of audit
and fine rates from the model, we show that the numerical estimate of MCFT
4
with tax evasion is 1.155 while the estimate without tax evasion is 1.076.8
When elasticities of labor supply are positive and marginal resource cost of
enforcement is sufficiently low, MCFp and MCFθ are less than 1, whereas
MCFT is greater than 1. If net-wage-rate elasticity of labor supply is positive,
an increase in income tax rate worsens the preexisting distortions of labor
supply and tax evasion.9 On the other hand, if audit- and fine-rate elasticities
of labor supply are positive, an increase in audit or fine rate alleviates the
preexisting distortions. Hence, tax reform and enforcement reform could be
complements rather than substitutes in this case. However, the magnitude of
MCFs varies according to elasticities of labor supply and marginal resource
cost of enforcement in general.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a
general equilibrium model of tax evasion that can be used to measure MCFs
and find the condition under which the tax evasion exists. Sections 3 introduces
a marginal revision in nonlinear income tax to derive MCFT. In section 4, we
consider a marginal change in audit and in fine to derive MCFp and MCFθ
respectively. Using benchmark parameters that represent the U.S. economy,
section 5 calculates the MCFs numerically, evaluates the alternative revenue-
raising instruments, and gives policy implications. We note limitations on this
analysis and offer future research in the concluding section.
8The numerical calculation uses the audit rate of .38 and the fine rate of 2. Furthermore,
it assumes that the collected revenue is used only for a tax-neutral government project.
9The positive elasticity of labor supply with respect to net wage rate implies that the




Consider an economy in which there is a unit measure of identical tax-
payers. Each individual taxpayer has a quasi-concave and twice differentiable
utility function U(C, V,G), where C is consumption of marketable goods, V
is leisure, and G represents a publicly provided nonmarketable good. The
taxpayers have three different kinds of income sources. They earn a wage at
a rate w by supplying their labor L from one unit of time (1 = L + V ) and
get an interest I by renting their stock of capital K0 endowed. In addition to
these incomes, each taxpayer receives an amount of government transfer C0
in a lump sum fashion. However, the privately earned labor incomes above
are subject to a nonlinear tax schedule T ; thus, the government revenue is
R = T (wL, φT ), where φT is a vector of marginal tax rates m and an average
tax rate t that the taxpayers face.10 The taxpayers are prone to hide some of
their tax liability, however, since the tax-collection agency cannot observe all
the earned incomes in the economy and, thus, audits only a fraction of them.
In order to prevent the taxpayers from evading their labor tax, the government
employs an enforcement mechanism φE that is a pair of an auditing rate p on
the population and a fine rate θ = 1 + π on the amount evaded, where π > 0
is the penalty rate. It is assumed that if it investigates a taxpayer’s declared
10As in Stuart (1984) and Mayshar (1991), we assume that the government puts a tax
only on the labor incomes, and therefore TI = 0. This assumption allows us to compare our
result to those of Stuart and Mayshar. But, it could be rather straightforward to extend to
the case of nonlabor income taxation.
6
income, a tax-collection agency immediately discovers tax evasion. Each indi-
vidual makes the decision of labor supply at the beginning of the period and,
in turn, reports some portion of their labor income X to the tax-collection
agency. These reports determine the after-tax income ex-ante. At the end of
the period, the taxpayer’s actual level of consumption becomes clear accord-
ing to one of two possible states. That is, he finds his amount of consumption
C1 = I+wL−T (X,φT )+C0 when not caught evading tax as state 1, whereas
C2 = I + wL− T (X,φT )− θ [R− T (X,φT )] + C0 in the case of being caught
evading tax as state 2.11 Denoting the tax evaded R − T (X,φT ) as E, the
budget constraint at each of two states can be rewritten as{
C1 = I + wL−R + E + C0 if the taxpayer is not caught evading,
C2 = I + wL−R− πE + C0 if the taxpayer is caught evading.
(1.1)
Furthermore, when the tax collection agency audits each taxpayer at a prob-
ability of detection p, the taxpayer has an expected utility function:
Ū = Ū (C1, C2, V,G, p) = (1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G). (1.2)
1.2.2 Tax evasion and labor supply
This subsection looks into the taxpayer’s decisions on labor supply and
tax evasion and derives a condition under which the tax evasion exists. This
condition will have an important implication on the results in the next two
11This setup slightly differs from Allingham-Sandmo (A-S) model. Here, the penalty paid
by the taxpayer is a function of the tax evaded, whereas in the A-S model the penalty rate
is on the income evaded or underreported income. See Yitzhaki (1974), Christiansen (1980),
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for more detail.
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sections. Regarding a market wage rate w, a nonlabor income I, and the
government fiscal program Ω as exogenously given, the individual taxpayer
chooses each of two possible consumption levels (C1, C2), a level of leisure V ,
and an amount of tax evasion E to maximize the expected utility in eq. (1.2)
subject to two budget constraints in eq. (1.1).12 Therefore, the corresponding
Lagrangian is
L = (1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G)
+ λ1 [I + wL− T (wL, φT ) + E + C0 − C1]
+ λ2 [I + wL− T (wL, φT )− πE + C0 − C2] , (1.3)
where λ1 and λ2 are the weighted marginal utility of income according to each
of two states. Setting the partial derivatives of the above Lagrangian equal to
zero finds the first order conditions:
LC1 = 0 : (1− p)UC(C1, V,G) = λ1, (1.4)
LC2 = 0 : pUC(C2, V,G) = λ2, (1.5)
LE = 0 : λ1 − πλ2 = 0, (1.6)
LV = 0 : (1− p)UV (C1, V,G) + pUV (C2, V,G) = (λ1 + λ2) (1−m)w. (1.7)
12Before we move on to the maximization problem of the taxpayer, it is worth mentioning
about the timing in the economy. First, each of the individuals faces the policy parameters
(p, t, θ). Then the equilibrium labor supply, evasion and wage are determined simultane-
ously. Finally, government transfers and consumption level are realized. Note that policy
parameters (p, t, θ) do not come from an optimization problem. In other words, government
does not optimize with respect to these policies. If the government maximized total utility
with respect to these policy parameters, marginal excess burden of these policies would have
been the same at the optimum.
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Evaluating the partial derivative LE at E = 0 together with eqs. (1.1),
(1.4), and (1.5), and then setting it greater than zero gives the condition for
tax evasion to appear (E > 0)
µ ≡ 1− pθ > 0, (1.8)
where µ represents the expected payoff of one dollar evaded, (1− p)·1+p·(−π).
Note that the tax parameters φT in the nonlinear tax function do not affect
whether the taxpayers evade or not. The existence of tax evasion depends
only on the enforcement mechanism φE. If the expected return µ is less than
or equal to zero, then the risk averse taxpayers must not evade any amount
of their tax liability.13 Just in the case of earning positive expected returns
to one dollar evaded, the taxpayers evade a fraction of tax that depends on
a degree of risk preference as well as a level of payoff expected. That is, the
positive expected payoff in eq. (1.8) could be interpreted as a gamble favorable
to the taxpayers.14 This condition will play a key role in the two next sections.







(1− p)UV (C1, V,G) + pUV (C2, V,G)
(1− p)UC(C1, V,G) + pUC(C2, V,G)
= (1−m)w, (1.10)
respectively. Eq. (1.9) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between
consumptions of state 1 (not caught) and state 2 (caught) should be equal
13If µ = 1 − pθ ≤ 0, there exists a corner solution which implies no tax evasion, E = 0.
Thus, the condition in (1.8) guarantees an interior solution, E > 0.
14A gamble is said to be fair (unfavorable) if it has a zero (negative) expected return. See
Arrow (1971) and Yitzhaki (1987) for more discussions
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to the ratio of ex-ante income loss relative to gain for one dollar evaded. An
increase in either probability of detection, penalty rate or both decreases tax
evasion as the marginal utility of consumption in state 1 becomes relatively
higher than in state 2. In eq. (1.10), the mean marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption is equated with net wage rate. Hence, a
higher marginal tax rate or a lower wage rate acts as a disincentive to labor
supply since the mean marginal utility of leisure gets relatively lower than that
of consumption.
1.2.3 Firm
By borrowing a fixed stock of capital and employing a level of labor from
the individuals, an aggregated firm produces market product Y = f (K0, L),
where the production technology f has positive and diminishing productivity.
Given the product price of one (normalized for simplicity), a wage rate, and
a capital rental rate, the firm maximizes its profit Π = f(K0, L) − I − wL,
which gives the wage rate and nonlabor income as follows:
w = fL(K0, L), (1.11)
I = Y − wL. (1.12)
Then the firm’s demand and the individuals’ supply for labor together with the
fixed level of capital determine an equilibrium wage rate and an equilibrium
rental price of capital in the competitive factor markets.
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1.2.4 Government
Since the size of population is measured as one, the probability of de-
tection p implies the ratio of taxpayers caught evading tax relative to all the
taxpayers. Therefore, the government revenue is
R̄ = R̄(wL,E, φT , φE) = (1− p) (R− E) + p (R + πE)− h (p, θ)
= R− (1− pθ)E − h (p, θ) . (1.13)
In eq. (1.13), both of labor income and tax evaded affect the revenue R̄. Note
that if all the individuals report their incomes truthfully and pay their tax
liabilities, the government collects the revenue equal to R−h (p, θ). To secure
a particular level of revenue, the government can employ the nonlinear income
taxes (φT = (m, t)) or force the taxpayers to pay the taxes they owe (φE =
(p, θ)). The resource cost h (p, θ) is increasing in audit and fine rates, i.e.
hp ≥ 0 and hθ ≥ 0. The government needs some portion of the collected
revenue to cover the cost of detecting tax evasion and penalizing tax evaders
for dishonesty. The rest is used to finance the supply of a nonmarket good G =
g(RG) and the transfer of market goods C0 = e(RC) in which the technology
of government production g and the transfer efficiency e satisfy g′ > 0 > g′′
and e′ > 0 > e′′, and two tax revenues RG and RC (in terms of market goods)
are spent for G and C0 respectively. Consequently, the government budget
constraint becomes RG +RC = R̄, and the set Ω = {G,C0, φT , φE} stands for
the government fiscal program.
11
1.3 Tax reform
In two consecutive sections, we consider a balanced-budget marginal
revision in the government fiscal program Ω, including either a nonlinear tax
reform that alters φT or an enforcement reform that alters φE and a corre-
sponding reform in spending that changes G and C0. Following the cost-benefit
framework as in Mayshar (1991), this section first investigates the effect of a
marginal revision only in the nonlinear tax schedule on the welfare of individ-
uals. The tax reform and corresponding reform in spending {G,C0, φT} ⊂ Ω
are desirable if total change in the taxpayer’s expected utility is positive or
equal to zero:
dŪ = ŪC1dC1 + ŪC2dC2 + ŪV dV + ŪGdG ≥ 0. (1.14)
Even though Ū depends on p as shown in eq. (1.2), there is no variation in Ū
with respect to p since a government does not consider any marginal changes in
enforcement policies. Differentiate the taxpayers’ two state-dependent budget
constraints in eq. (1.1), the interest in eq. (1.12) and the government revenue
function in eq. (1.13) to get dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0, dC2 = dY − dR −
πdE + dC0, and dR̄ = dR − µdE. Furthermore, we have dV + dL = 0 from
one unit of time and dY = wdL by differentiating the production function and
then using the wage rate in eq. (1.11). Combining these equations together
with the first-order conditions in eqs. (1.4) - (1.7) gives
[
ŪG/ (λ1 + λ2)
]
dG+ dC0 ≥ dR̄ + µdE −mwdL, (1.15)
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where the right- and left-hand sides of which indicate the marginal cost of tax
reform and the marginal benefit of corresponding reform in spending in terms
of dollar value.15 Suppose that the government uses a share β of its marginal
revenue dR̄ to transfer the market goods and the remaining to supply the
nonmarket good, i.e. dRC = βdR̄ and dRG = (1 − β)dR̄. Dividing the left-
and right-hand sides of eq. (1.15) by dR̄ > 0, we define the marginal benefit
and cost of funds as follows:
MBF ≡(1− β)g′(RG)
[
ŪG/ (λ1 + λ2)
]
+ βe′(RC)
≥ 1 + (µdE −mwdL) /dR̄ ≡ MCFT. (1.16)
The left- and right-hand sides of eq. (1.16) imply the welfare benefit and cost
of the marginal tax dollar to the individuals in this economy. Note that R =
T (wL, φT ) = twL. Differentiating eq. (1.13) yields the marginal government
revenue:
dR̄ = (1− γ)twdL+ wLdt− µdE. (1.17)
In eq. (1.17), γ = (dw/dL) (L/w) = −LfLL/fL is the elasticity of wage rate
with respect to labor supply. Substituting eq. (1.17) into the marginal cost of
funds in eq. (1.16) leads to the following:
MCFT = 1 +
µdE −mwdL
(1− γ) twdL+ wLdt− µdE
. (1.18)
15From eqs. (1.4), (1.5) and (1.7), dŪ = λ1dC1 + λ2dC2 + (λ1 + λ2)(1−m)wdV + ŪGdG.
Plug dC1 = dY − dR + dE + dC0 and dC2 = dY − dR − πdE + dC0 into this equation
to get dŪ = (λ1 + λ2)[dY − dR + dC0 + (1 − m)wdV ] + (λ1 − πλ2)dE + ŪGdG. Since
dY = wdL, dV = −dL, dR̄ = dR − µdE, and from eq. (1.6), λ1 − πλ2 = 0, we have that
dŪ = (λ1 +λ2)[dC0−dR̄−µdE+mwdL]+ŪGdG. Finally, set dŪ ≥ 0, divide this inequality
by λ1 + λ2, and rearrange it to arrive at eq. (1.15).
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If the expected payoff of one dollar evaded becomes less than or equal to zero
(µ ≤ 0), each taxpayer does not evade any fraction of his tax on labor income
(E = 0). Under this case, the taxpayer changes only his labor supply in re-
sponse to the marginal revision in tax policy. Consequently, the marginal cost
of funds in eq. (1.18) exactly reduces to that of Mayshar (1991). However, our
analysis generalizes Mayshar’s formula. We derive the marginal cost of funds,
including even the circumstance where taxpayers evade their tax liabilities
(E > 0) when the expected payoff is greater than zero (µ > 0). Hence, the
taxpayer changes his tax evaded as well as labor supply when a government
revises a given tax rate.
We evaluate the changes in tax evasion and labor supply, i.e. dE and
dL in eq. (1.18), to derive MCFT in terms of exogenous parameters in this
model. The evaluation of dE needs log-linearization and Taylor expansion.



































r (C1) dC1 = r (C2) dC2, (1.19)
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where r (·) ≡ −UCC(·,V,G)
UC(·,V,G)
denotes the absolute risk aversion or curvature of util-
ity function.16 Two state-dependent marginal utility functions UC(C1, V,G)
and UC(C2, V,G) can be approximated by the first-order Taylor expansion as
follows:
UC(C1, V,G) = UC(C2, V,G) + UCC(C2, V,G)(C1 − C2),
UC(C2, V,G) = UC(C1, V,G) + UCC(C1, V,G)(C2 − C1).
Dividing these two approximations by UC(C2, V,G) and UC(C1, V,G) respec-









where the tax evaded E is assumed to be positive.17 The absolute risk aversion
at each of C1 and C2 is determined only by the tax evaded E as a endogenous
variable and two enforcement policies p and θ = 1 + π as exogenous parame-
ters.18 Substituting the two absolute risk aversions into eq. (1.19) and using







(dY − dR + dC0) , (1.21)
16Take the partial derivatives of eq. (1.9) with respect to V and G, and again, divide







17Even if E = 0 and thus C1 = C2, the two state-dependent marginal utility functions
UC(C1, V,G) and UC(C2, V,G) are equal to the approximations respectively, and further-
more, eq. (1.19) is satisfied.
18Using absolute risk aversion term itself will add two additional parameters to our cal-
culation and will make the numerical estimation harder.
15
where σ ≡ p(1 − p)θ2 represents the variance of one dollar evaded. On the
right of eq. (1.21), the positive coefficient in the first parentheses measures
the extent to which the taxpayers change the tax evaded when their incomes
change. Since the mean and variance that the coefficient includes depend only
on the audit rate p and fine rate θ, the degree of tax evasion in this economy is
affected by the current state of tax enforcement. In addition, eq. (1.21) shows
that the taxpayers reduce their taxes evaded when their disposable incomes
get higher. Thus, the taxpayer responds to the fiscal reform in the opposite
way; they evade more taxes if the government collects a revenue dR, but they
evade fewer taxes if it transfers the revenue dC0 back. Since dY = wdL,
dR = (1− γ)twdL+ wLdt, and dC0 = βe′ (RC) dR, the change in tax evaded
in eq. (1.21) can be rewritten as
dE =−
[
(µ/σ) (1− (1− γ)t (1− βe′(RC)))






1 + (µ2/σ) (1− βe′(RC))
]
wLdt (1.22)
in terms of the change in labor supply and average tax rate. Since both
coefficients in the first and second square brackets are positive, the change in
tax evaded is negatively related to the change in labor supply but positively
related to the change in tax rate. If a government increases tax rates and this
causes less labor supplies, then the taxpayers could evade much more. We do
not conclude at this point, however, because it has not been figured out yet
whether the higher tax rate has a negative effect on labor supply.
The next step is to evaluate the change dL in labor supply. Before
16
doing so, we adopt the virtual income concept that Hausman (1985) introduced
first and Mayshar (1991) applied later. The concept is used in order to make
linear budget constraints from the views of utility-optimizing individuals, even
though the tax function is nonlinear.19 In the context of tax evasion, the two
state-dependent budget constraints in eq. (1.1) can be reformulated as C1 =
(1−m)wL+E+Z for being caught in tax evasion and C2 = (1−m)wL−πE+Z
for not being caught by applying a virtual income Z in the following form:
Z = Y − (1−m)wL−R + C0. (1.23)
Eq. (2.34) contains non-labor income Y −wL, the lump-sum transfer C0, and
the term (m − t)wL generated by the nonlinear tax schedule. Since each
taxpayer regards Z as exogenously given, the first order conditions in eqs.
(1.4) - (1.7) and the two reformulated budget constraints give the function of
labor supply as L = L((1 − m)w, p, π,G, Z). Therefore, after differentiating





d ((1−m)w) + LGdG+ LZdZ, (1.24)
where η is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net
wage (1−m)w. As in Stuart (1984) and Mayshar (1991), the publicly supplied
nonmarket good G is assumed to be tax-neutral at the margin, which implies
that the marginal change dG does not directly affect labor supply, LG ≡ 0,
19See Mayshar (1991) for more detail.
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or the government tax revenue.20 Using the expenditure function approach,
Appendix A.1 shows that η − (1 − m)wLZ = ηc in which the superscript c
indicates ‘compensated,’ while no superscript implies ‘uncompensated.’ Using
this fact and the assumption that LG = 0, eq. (1.24) can be rewritten as
follows:
(1−m)(1 + γη)dL = −ηLdm− (ηc − η)dZ/w. (1.25)
In addition, after differentiating eq. (2.34), the marginal change in virtual
income Z is given as the following:
dZ = (m+ γ (1−m))wdL+ wLdm− (1− βe′ (RC)) dR− βe′ (RC)µdE
= [γ + (1− γ) (m− t (1− βe′ (RC)))]wdL
+ wL (dm− (1− βe′ (RC)) dt)− βe′ (RC)µdE. (1.26)
Conducting the total differentiation until now leaves a system of three equa-
tions (1.22), (1.25) and (1.26) with three unknowns dE, dL and dZ. Substi-
tuting eq. (1.22) into eq. (1.26), and in turn, eq. (1.26) into eq. (1.25) implies
the proportional change L̃ in eq. (1.27), in which the tilde above a variable (or
parameter) represents a proportional change in the variable (or parameter).
Solving the three equations above simultaneously gives dL and dE in
terms of exogenous parameters. Finally, substituting eqs. (1.22) and (1.27)
into eq. (1.18), we derive the MCFT for the tax reform in eq. (1.28)
L̃ = −
»





(1−m)(1 + γηc) + (ηc − η)
»







20This assumption is ensured when the private goods is weakly separable from the pub-
lic good G in the expected utility function Ū . For example, if the conventional util-
ity function U(C, V,G) is additive or multiplicative, then the expected utility function
Ū(C1, C2, V,G, p) = (1− p)U(C1, V,G) + pU(C2, V,G) can satisfy the property.
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a+ bηcdm/dt+ (µ2/σ +m) ((ηc − η)− ηcdm/dt)
,
(1.28)
where a ≡ (1−m) (1 + γηc) and b ≡ m− (1− γ) t.
The MCFT is only measured in terms of exogenous parameters. As seen
in eq. (1.18), MCFT in eq. (1.28) also reduces to Mayshar’s for µ
2/σ = 0 (i.e.,
no tax evasion). It is possible to show that the MCFT in eq. (1.28) is greater
than Mayshar’s (See the equation 17 in his paper) when dm/dt > 0.21 This is
logical because the existence of tax evasion makes the economic environment
uncertain and, in turn, causes an additional burden to the economy. Our
MCFT includes both the labor supply distortion of tax and the risk bearing
cost of tax evasion. In eq. (1.28), we see that MCFT has a direct cost of one
dollar plus an additional term representing the labor supply distortion and
risk bearing cost together. Yitzhaki (1987) points out that the total excess
burden of risk and tax distortion can be treated separately if utility function
is separable in consumption and labor. We do not restrict the utility function
to a specific form in our model. Therefore, risk bearing cost and tax distortion
are interrelated in our model.
21Note that dm/dt > 0 is a sufficient but not a necessary condition to show analytically
that our MCFT is greater than Mayshar’s. Stuart (1984) assumes that ratio of marginal
tax rate and average tax rate is constant and greater than 1. In progressive tax system for
a given income level average tax rate is always lower than the marginal tax rate. However,
whether dm is greater than dt or not depends on how the tax system is changed.
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1.4 Enforcement reform
In the previous section, the government revises the nonlinear tax sched-
ule for extra revenue to finance its additional expenditure. Even though the
tax scheme is used as a common policy instrument, the government could em-
ploy the audit rate or the fine rate instead. For example, the IRS increased the
audit rate on individuals with more than $100,000 of income by 40% in 2004.22
This kind of practice often attracts a new analysis on measuring the costs of
enforcement policies. In addition, the analysis can allow one to compare the
costs of enforcement and tax policies together. Hence, this section derives two
different MCFs when a tax collection agency could use either the audit rate p
or the fine rate θ in the enforcement mechanism φE. Although the two MCFs
are derived separately at the end, we first consider the revision in both the au-
dit and fine rate by some point in this section and then assume only the change
in each of the enforcement policies from that point on. Following the same
definitions and steps used in the section above, we continue to exploit total
differentiation in order to investigate the effects of tax enforcement changes on
individuals’ welfare. Now, the enforcement reform and corresponding reform
in spending {G,C0, φE} ⊂ Ω are desirable if total change in the taxpayer’s
expected utility is positive or equal to zero:
dŪ = ŪC1dC1 + ŪC2dC2 + ŪV dV + ŪGdG+ Ūpdp ≥ 0. (1.29)
22Give reference at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/business/19irs.html.
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Eq. (1.29) includes Ūpdp as one more term than eq. (1.14). In contrast to
the tax reform, the revision in audit rate could directly affect the taxpayer’s
utility function since the uncertainty of this economy has been generated by
the government’s random audits. Differentiate two state-dependent budget
constraints of individuals in eq. (1.1), the market interest in eq. (1.12) and the
expected revenue of government in eq. (1.13) to have dC1 = dY−dR+dE+dC0,
dC2 = dY − dR − πdE − Edπ + dC0, and dR̄ = dR − µdE + (θE − hp) dp +
(pE − hθ) dθ. We know from the previous section that dV = −dL and dY =
wdL. Combining these indentities together with the first-order conditions in
eq. (1.4) - (1.7) yields the following:23
ŪG
λ1 + λ2
dG+ dC0 ≥dR̄ + µdE −mwdL+
(












Eq. (1.30) implies that the marginal cost of enforcement reform on the right
should be less than or equal to the marginal benefit of corresponding reform
in spending on the left. The term Ūp = −U (C1, V,G) + U (C2, V,G) can be
approximated to −UC (C2, V,G) (C1 − C2) by the first-order Taylor expansion.
Using this approximation together with eqs. (1.1), (1.5) and (1.6) and dividing
23From eqs. (1.4), (1.5), and (1.7), dŪ = λ1dC1 +λ2dC2 +(λ1 +λ2)(1−m)wdV + ŪGdG+
Ūpdp. Substitute dC1 = dY − dR+ dE + dC0 and dC2 = dY − dR− πdE −Edπ+ dC0 into
this equation to get dŪ = (λ1 +λ2)(dY −dR+dC0 +(1−m)wdV )+(λ1−πλ2)dE−λ2Edπ+
ŪGdG+Ūpdp. Since dY = wdL, dV = −dL, dR̄ = dR−µdE+(θE−h′(p))dp+(pE−i′(θ))dθ,
dπ = dθ, and from eq. (1.6), λ1 − πλ2 = 0, we have that dŪ = (λ1 + λ2)[dC0 − dR̄− µdE +
mwdL + (θE − h′(p))dp + (pE − i′(θ))dθ] − λ2Edθ + ŪGdG + Ūpdp. Finally, set dŪ ≥ 0,
divide this inequality by λ1 + λ2, and rearrange it to arrive at eq. (1.30).
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≥ 1 + µdE −mwdL+ (hp − θE + E/p) dp+ (hθ − pE + E/θ) dθ
dR̄
≡ MCFE, (1.31)
where the government is assumed again to spend the fraction β of its marginal
expected revenue on the transfer. Compared to eq. (1.16), the marginal cost
of funds is quite different, while the marginal benefit of funds is still same in
eq. (1.31). Since there is no change in tax rates, dR = (1−γ)twdL. Thus, the
marginal change in the government’s expected revenue in eq. (1.13) becomes
dR̄ = (1− γ)twdL− µdE + (θE − hp) dp+ (pE − hθ) dθ. (1.32)
After inserting eq. (1.32) into the right-hand side of eq. (1.31), the marginal
cost of funds associated with the change in probability of detection p and fine
rate θ becomes
MCFE = 1 +
µdE −mwdL+ E (php/E − pθ + 1) p̃+ E (θhθ/E − pθ + 1) θ̃
(1− γ)twdL− µdE + E (pθ − php/E) p̃+ E (pθ − θhθ/E) θ̃
.
(1.33)
Through the same steps used in Section 4, we will evaluate the changes
dL and dE in response to the reform. As the first step, the change in tax
evasion dE is derived in terms of the change in labor supply dL. After taking






















Plugging eq. (1.20) into eq. (1.19) with the fact that dC1 = dY −dR+dE+dC0


















In eq. (1.34), the second term in square brackets shows that the changes in p
and θ decrease the amount of tax evaded. This implies that both the audit
and fine rate determine the existence as well as the degree of tax evasion.
The enforcement policies directly affect the evasion, whereas the tax codes
indirectly affect the evasion through the income change as in eq. (1.21).
From this point, we consider only the change in each separate enforce-
ment policy. The government is assumed to revise either of two enforcement
policies p and θ. Let us introduce a function that makes both of the analyses
simple. For k ∈ φE, the function ξk is defined by{
ξp = pθµ/σ if dp 6= 0 and dθ = 0,
ξθ = 0 if dθ = 0 and dθ 6= 0.
Then two separate analyses can be united because they have perfect symmetry
except for the term that ξk implies. The second term in square brackets in
eq. (1.34) points out the only difference between two separate reforms. A
revision in audit rate directly reformulates individuals’ preference orderings,
since the audit rate as a policy parameter generates the uncertainty in this
23
economy. Therefore, based on the fact that dY = wdL, dR = (1 − γ)twdL,
and dC0 = βe
′ (RC) dR, the change dE for each of the two reforms becomes
dE =−
[
(µ/σ) (1− (1− γ)t (1− βe′(RC)))





(1− ξk) /µ+ (µ/σ) (pθ − khk/E) βe′(RC)
1 + (µ2/σ) (1− βe′(RC))
]
k̃. (1.35)
Next, we evaluate the change in labor supply dL by replicating the
steps employed in the previous section. Totally differentiating the labor supply




d ((1−m)w) + εkLk̃ + LGdG+ LZdZ, (1.36)
where εk is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
enforcement policy k ∈ φE. Again, using the assumption that G is tax-neutral
at the margin and totally differentiating the virtual income in eq. (2.34) re-
spectively, the total effects dL and dZ become the following:
(1−m) (1 + γη) dL = (1−m)Lεkk̃ − (ηc − η) dZ/w, (1.37)
dZ = (m+ γ (1−m))wdL− (1− βe′ (RC)) dR
− βe′ (RC)
(
µdE − E (pθ − khk/E) k̃
)
= [γ + (1− γ) (m− t (1− βe′ (RC)))]wdL
− βe′ (RC)
(
µdE − E (pθ − khk/E) k̃
)
. (1.38)
Finally, as in the previous sections, three equations (1.35), (1.37) and
(1.38) yield the change in labor supply and the MCFE as
L̃ =
»
(1−m) εk − (ηc − η)ϕ
`





(1−m) (1 + γηc) + (ηc − η)
»



















(1−m) bεck − ϕa
´








(1−m) (µ2/σ + (1− γ) t) εk + ϕ (1 + ck) (a+ (ηc − η) b)
,
(1.40)
where ϕ ≡ E/wL = − (1−m) (εck − εk) / (ηc − η) for k ∈ φE and ck ≡
(1 + µ2/σ) (pθ − khk/E)− ξk.
In a world with tax evasion and positive tax rates there are two different
sources of deadweight loss (or inefficiency). One is distorted labor supply
because of labor tax. The other is the risk cost of evading tax. If we assume
that wage, audit and fine elasticity of labor supply are greater than zero (η, εp,
and εθ > 0), then the following results hold. Increasing tax rates (tax reform)
causes a decrease in labor supply and an increase in tax evasion (dL < 0 and
dE > 0) as can be seen in the above equations. Hence, tax reform worsens
preexisting tax distortions. MCFT has a direct resource cost of one dollar as
well as additional deadweight loss. Thus, MCFT is greater than 1. However,
enforcement reform (i.e., increasing audit or fine rate) causes an increase in
labor supply and a decrease in tax evasion (dL > 0 and dE < 0). This
means preexisting distortions caused by tax are lowered by enforcement reform.
MCFE has a direct cost of one dollar, marginal resource cost of enforcement,
and negative deadweight loss. For this reason, when the enforcement reform is
costless or has a sufficient low cost, MCFE can be less than one. Enforcement
could actually be a very useful policy, if costs associated with increasing audit
or fine rates are low. Increasing enforcement will lower preexisting distortions
and yield more extra revenue. The government can then use the revenue to
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lower other distortionary taxes. This argument is very similar to the double-
dividend hypothesis of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994).24 The first dividend is
decreased labor supply and tax evasion distortions while the second dividend
is obtained by using tax revenue to lower some distortionary taxes.
If extra revenue from either enforcement or tax reform is used in the
same way, and the enforcement has a low marginal resource cost, MCFT is
greater than one while MCFE is less than one. In this case, the enforcement
reform is superior to tax reform. In that sense, tax reform and enforcement
reform are complements rather than substitutes in terms of efficiency. In
other words, a tax reform increases the excess burden while an enforcement
reform decreases excess burden in the economy. Thus, a tax reform should be
accompanied by an enforcement reform to minimize the extra burden caused by
tax reform. A very high marginal cost for enforcement or negative enforcement
elasticity of labor supply may indeed cause tax and enforcement reform to be
substitutes.
Government can increase enforcement in two ways. It can increase the
audit or fine rates. It is not easy to see which enforcement policy has a lower
MCF from the above equations. However, the terms cp, cθ, εp, and εθ play an
important role in determining the magnitude of MCFs. Therefore, by compar-
ing these terms, we can say which policy has lower MCF. We mentioned above
24Double-dividend is the notion that environmental taxes can both reduce pollution (the
first dividend) and reduce the overall economic costs associated with the tax system by
using the revenue generated to displace other more distortionary taxes that slow economic
growth at the same time (the second dividend).
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that probability and penalty elasticities of labor supply mainly determine the
response of labor supply, dL, and it is positive if εp and εθ > 0. The bigger the
elasticity, the greater the labor supply response. Therefore, a higher elasticity
means a higher decrease in tax distortion and a lower MCF. The marginal
cost of increasing the audit and fine rates is included in the terms cp and cθ.
As marginal cost of enforcement (audit and fine) increases, both MCFp and
MCFθ increase. Everything the same, the enforcement policy that has higher
elasticity of labor supply and lower marginal cost will have a smaller MCF.
We can also say that the audit and fine rates are substitutes for each other
in terms of efficiency of policy. They both decrease preexisting labor supply
distortion (conditional on εp and εθ > 0) and yield extra government revenue.
1.5 Numerical analysis
In this section, we calculate MCFs for alternative policies numerically.
To estimate MCFT, we need values for 8 parameters: η
c, η, t, m, dm/dt, γ, β,
p, θ. In Table 1.1, Stuart (1984) suggests the following benchmark parameters
for U.S. economy: η = 0, ηc = η−.2, γ = .28, m = .427, m/t = dm/dt = 1.564.
In addition, we assume for now that β = 0. To find values for audit rate p
and fine rate θ, we first solve the model for a specific utility function. Then,
to find proper values for audit and fine rates, we match the tax evasion ratio
that our model estimates with the real world tax evasion ratio, 17%.25 We
25IRS estimate of tax evasion for 2001 is 17%. U.S department of Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service (2006)
27
assume separable CRRA utility function







where V is leisure and we normalize time endowment to 1 so that V = (1−L).
We assume utility function parameters δ and ε are equal to 2. We solve our
model with specified utility function and given parameter values. Equilibrium
values of labor supply and tax evasion imply that when p = .38, θ = 2, the
tax evasion ratio is 17%.26 To estimate MCFE, we need values for εp, εθ, hp,
hθ, and E more. In other words, we need labor supply elasticity with respect
to audit and fine rate, marginal resource cost of audit and fine rate, and the
amount of evasion. We find E, εp and εθ from the solution of our model with
utility function above.27
In Table 1.2, we compare our MCFT estimates with those of Mayshar
(1991) for different government policy and individual parameter values. We
analytically showed above that our MCFT estimate is greater than Mayshar’s.
The estimates in the first column are based on our MCFT formula. The
second column estimates are based on Mayshar’s formula. In the first row
of Table 1.2, we present MCFT estimation for different values of β. When
26There many values for p and θ that gives 17% evasion rate. We fix penalty rate to 1
and get p = .38. IRS penalty rate for tax evasion varies between 25% and 75% depending
on the nature of the tax underpayment, so fixing penalty rate to 1 makes sense.However,
auditing rate in the US is much lower than 38%. In the real world auditing rate is not
exogenous to taxable income. Also it is much harder for wage earners to evade compared to
self employed. Since our model does not consider this aspect of tax evasion, 38% auditing
rate seems reasonable.
27Tax evasion is .04, labor supply is .56 and taxable income is .23 in equilibrium in our
model. Note that we normalize time endowment and wage to 1.
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Table 1.1: Benchmark parameters for the
U.S. economy
Stuart (1984) : η = 0
ηc = η − .2
γ = .28
m = .427
m/t = dm/dt = 1.564
Baseline : εp = εθ = 0
β = 0
hp = hθ = 0
Model : θ = 2
p = .38
E = .04
β = 0, no government revenue is transferred to taxpayers, and when β = 1,
all tax revenue is transferred to taxpayers. We see that our MCFT estimate
is greater than Mayshar’s no matter how the extra tax revenue is spent by
the government. In the second row, we change the marginal tax rate, while in
the third and fourth row we change audit and fine rates respectively. It is not
surprising that a higher marginal income tax rate leads to higher MCFT for
both our estimate and Mayshar’s. However, only labor supply is distorted in
Mayshar’s case, while both labor supply and tax evasion are distorted in our
case. More enforcement (higher audit and fine rates) means less MCFT because
more enforcement causes less evasion in equilibrium. In the third row, for
p = .45, our MCFT estimate is very close to Mayshar’s since people have almost
no incentive to evade when p = .45 (expected return on evading, 1−pθ, is still
positive but very close to 0). We change labor supply elasticity in the fifth row.
As elasticity increases, labor supply distortion of a tax increase becomes more
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severe, and this leads to higher MCFT for both our and Mayshar’s model.
Table 1.2: MCFT with tax evasion versus without tax evasion
MCFT
Tax evasion No tax evasion
Benchmark case 1.155 1.076
Government policies
1. Share of marginal revenue
β = .618 1.210 1.160
β = 1 1.244 1.211
2. Marginal tax rate
m = .350 1.131 1.055
m = .460 1.167 1.087
3. Audit rate
p = .2 1.870 1.076
p = .45 1.070 1.076
4. Fine rate
θ = 2.3 1.092 1.076
θ = 2.6 1.078 1.076
Taxpayer
5. Net-wage-rate elasticity
η = .318 1.641 1.447
η = .5 1.986 1.687
Table 1.3 compares the MCFs for three alternative revenue-raising poli-
cies (tax, audit, and fine rates), depending on different government policy and
taxpayer parameters. In general, MCFT is greater than MCFp and MCFθ in
Table 1.3. Audit and fine rates (p, θ) determine the riskiness of tax evasion
(µ2/σ). More riskiness means that the risk cost of evading tax is greater.
Hence, as seen in the third and fourth rows, either an increase in p and θ in-
creases MCFs, raising the riskiness of tax evasion. A higher marginal resource
cost of tax enforcement (hp, hθ) means higher MCFp and MCFθ. In fifth row,
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when hp = hθ = 5, MCFp and MCFθ are 1.754 and 1.423 respectively, while
MCFT is 1.155. Therefore, if increasing enforcement marginally is costly, then
tax reform has a lower marginal cost compared to enforcement reform. Elas-
ticities of labor supply also play a key role in determining the magnitude of
MCFs for different policies. In the 7th row, when εp = εθ = −.5, MCFp and
MCFθ are greater than MCFT. MCFp and MCFθ are 1.397 and 1.189 respec-
tively, while MCFT is 1.155. Elasticities have an opposite effect on MCFT and
MCFE. While higher wage elasticity (η) causes more labor supply distortion
in the tax reform case, higher enforcement elasticities (εp, εθ) mean less tax
distortion for labor supply in the enforcement reform case.
In Figure 1.1, we graph MCFs for different values of µ2/σ when β = 0
, hp = hθ = 0. In our formulation of MCFs above, the term µ
2/σ represents
the riskiness of tax evasion. Note that µ is the expected return on evading
one dollar and σ is variance of return. As the audit rate or fine rate goes
down, µ increases while σ decreases, and thus, overall µ2/σ increases. In other
words, when auditing becomes less common or when fines on evasion are lower,
expected return on tax evasion will be greater, and taxpayers will evade more
in equilibrium. Thus, the taxpayers’ response dE to a policy reform will be
higher (since expected return is higher), leading to more distortion. MCFT is
greater than MCFE for all values of µ
2/σ, since the enforcement is assumed to
be costless. Figure 1.2 shows how MCFE changes as marginal resource cost of
enforcement (hp, hθ) increases. When the enforcement policy to deter evasion
becomes more costly, MCFE increases tremendously. This is trivial because our
31
Table 1.3: MCFs with tax evasion for alternative revenue-raising policies
MCFT MCFp MCFθ
Benchmark case 1.155 .657 .587
Government Policies
1. Share of marginal revenue
β = .618 1.210 .704 .633
β = 1 1.245 .733 .662
2. Marginal tax rate
m = .35 1.131 .657 .587
m = .46 1.167 .657 .587
m = .35 (β = 1) 1.183 .703 .633
m = .46 (β = 1) 1.276 .748 .676
3. Audit rate
p = .2 1.870 1.250 .961
p = .45 1.070 .555 .529
4. Fine rate
θ = 2.5 1.065 .521 .513
θ = 3 1.033 .453 .469
5. Marginal resource costs of audit and fine rate
hp = hθ = .5 1.155 .674 .624
hp = hθ = 2 1.155 .877 .767
hp = hθ = 5 1.155 1.754 1.423
Taxpayer
6. Net-wage-rate elasticity
η = .318 1.641 .657 .587
η = .5 1.986 .657 .587
η = .318 (β = 1) 1.725 .725 .654
η = .5 (β = 1) 2.060 .720 .650
7. Audit- and fine-rate elasticities
εp = εθ = −.5 1.155 1.397 1.189
εp = εθ = .5 1.155 .433 .366
MCFE includes the resource cost of increasing tax enforcement as well as labor
supply distortion and risk-bearing cost. Thus, when policymakers decide which
policy to use to raise additional tax revenue, they need to analyze carefully
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Figure 1.1: MCFs and riskiness of tax evasion


























how much increasing tax enforcement costs. In Figure 1.3 , we see how MCFs
change with public spending policy. As β increases, all MCFs go up. When
β = 1, extra tax revenue is returned to individuals. This compensates the
income effect of the tax or enforcement reform. As a result, when β goes up,
labor supply distortion increases, causing MCFs to go up as well.
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Figure 1.2: MCFs and marginal resource cost of tax enforcement

























In a general equilibrium of tax evasion, we analytically derive three
MCFs for the nonlinear tax, audit, and fine rates. Ignoring the tax evasion
behavior will underestimate the MCFT. In a world with tax evasion, indi-
viduals could get more welfare loss from both tax distortion and uncertainty
introduced by tax evasion. When calculating MCFT, taking the risk-bearing
cost of evasion into account will give more accurate estimates. Thus, govern-
ments should consider the risk-bearing cost of tax evasion while deciding on
publicly funded projects. Alm (1985) argues that tax evasion can cause an-
other type of burden because of inefficient allocation of resources by taxpayers
who try to evade. Even though the MCFT estimates in this paper are always
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Figure 1.3: MCFs and public spending policy

























greater than in Mayshar (1991) and Stuart (1984), they are highly dependent
on values assigned to audit and fine rate, however.
Governments can also use audit rate or fine rate in addition to tax rate
as a policy tool. Considering efficiency cost of each policy is important when
a government decides how to collect additional tax revenue. Our calculations
show that, compared to a tax reform, an enforcement mechanism generates
a lower MCF if the marginal resource cost of enforcement is low. However,
when audit and fine elasticities of labor supply are negative and the marginal
resource cost of using these policies is high, then the tax reform might have a
lower MCF than the enforcement reform. In addition, it may not always be
feasible to use enforcement policies in practice. For example, higher income
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individuals or some firms may lobby to government not to increase audit rate
or penalty rate on tax evasion. Thus, using audit or fine rate might have
some additional costs to a society in terms of effort and time spent in passing
bills in congress. Our model does not cover this aspect of the economy. The
magnitudes of MCFs are mainly determined by elasticities of labor supply and
marginal costs of enforcement policies in our model. Our model suggests that
when enforcement is costless or has a low cost and labor supply elasticities
are positive, using enforcement as a policy tool is superior to a tax reform.
Furthermore, when a government increase a tax rate, increasing enforcement
neutralizes the extra distortion caused by the increased tax rate.
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Chapter 2
Social Status, Conspicuous Consumption
Levies, and Distortionary Taxation
2.1 Introduction
Tax system is very diverse in practice. Whereas the United States re-
lies mainly on income taxation, many countries in the European Union weight
differential commodity taxation. Further, developing countries usually impose
differential taxes on luxury goods to prevent wasteful consumption. As in
the view of Veblen (1899), people advertise their positions in a wealth hierar-
chy by consuming expensive products such as Rolex watches. Such individual
behaviors set off a status-seeking game that wastefully allocates income for
more “positional goods.” Nonetheless, to seek higher status through conspic-
uous consumption, ones have much incentive to supply labor at a higher level,
which can alleviate preexisting income-tax distortion. Accordingly, differential
taxes on positional goods reduce this positive effect of conspicuous consump-
tion on labor supply even though reallocating income for more “nonpositional
goods.” Therefore, the differential taxes generate two opposite consequences
in a tax system.
Without arriving at definite conclusions and with being still open to
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debate even today, much has been written about the choice between differen-
tial commodity and income taxes for an optimal tax structure. The prominent
work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and subsequent studies by Christiansen
(1984) and Saez (2002) conclude that an optimal tax structure consists of
only nonlinear income taxes without any commodity taxes under the condi-
tion in which utility is separable between commodities and leisure.1 Moreover,
Kaplow (2006) shows that commodity taxation is still undesirable even if the
preexisting income taxes are not optimal as in reality. In other words, dif-
ferential commodity taxes cannot supplement either optimal or not optimal
nonlinear income taxes. However, all the previous studies ignore status effect
in a form of externality that the consumption of positional goods carries. The
differential taxes on positional goods in this case can function as a corrective
tool for cutting down wasteful consumption from status-seeking race. In ad-
dition, the taxes also generate revenue that can be used to lessen preexisting
income-tax distortion. Hence, the differential taxes on positional goods may
supplement the nonlinear income taxes by generating a “double dividend” —
not only a reduced conspicuous consumption, but also a less distortionary tax
structure.
A related literature on environmental economics pays attention to op-
timal second-best environmental taxes when distortionary income taxes are
required for a given revenue. Extending the basic point of Pigou (1920) to
the second-best case, Sandmo (1975) ascertains that commodity taxes can be
1Commodity demands are unrelated to labor supply on that assumption.
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used as an instrument for correcting resource misallocation that externalities
bring about. Further, many papers on the ‘double-dividend hypothesis’ study
the role of environmental taxes not only as a corrective tool for environmen-
tal externality but also as a revenue-raising device (see e.g., Bovenberg and
de Mooij, 1994, Parry, 1995, 1997, Goulder et al., 1997, Parry et al., 1999,
Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001). These studies show that the optimal tax is gen-
erally positive on a good that causes a negative externality. The “positional
externality” studied in this paper is similar in that it entails a negative exter-
nality, but differs because that externality also provides an extra incentive to
supply more labor. This second-best environmental tax literature also suggests
that optimal taxes will be lower on goods that encourage labor supply (e.g.,
see Williams, 2002). Thus there are two offsetting effects on the optimal tax
rate, unlike in the standard case considered in the environmental literature.2
The purpose of this paper is to explore optimal tax structure in the
presence of status effect. I develop a game-theoretic model in which each
individual with a different labor productivity unknown to the others engages
in a status-seeking game, and government has a revenue requirement. Then I
examine the welfare effect of a revenue-neutral shift in the tax-mix away from
nonlinear income taxes towards positional-good taxes.
2Employing a status-seeking game, Frank (1985) as well as Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)
show that individuals have relatively fewer expenditures on nonpositional goods for a given
exogenous income. In this case, the offsetting effect on labor supply would not appear.
However, this paper’s model allows for endogenous labor supply and thus the two offsetting
effects on the optimal tax are both present.
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The contribution of this work is to provide economic rationale for prac-
tical use of differential taxes on positional goods which could be corrective
and even revenue-raising instruments in a tax system. To correct the exter-
nality from conspicuous consumption, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) suggest
per-unit taxes positively associated with income levels, since individuals with
relatively higher incomes spends money more on positional goods and, thus,
generate the externality more. The corrective instrument that depends on in-
come is too unrealistic to apply to the actual tax environment. In contrast,
this paper employs differential commodity taxes which do not depend on the
income levels, so that a government should be able to establish the real appli-
cation. It still has the function of correcting the externality, however. Ireland
(2001) finds only optimal income taxes, under an assumption that a tax au-
thority cannot directly observe how individuals consume positional goods, and
thus cannot levy taxes on conspicuous consumption. Thus, the optimal income
taxes by itself acts as an instrument for both corrective and revenue-raising
objectives. However, a government can know which types of commodities are
visible and carry status effect in the real world. I present a government prob-
lem in which the tax authority choose an alternative tax system when given a
set of possible tax instruments (i.e. not only income taxes but also commodity
taxes). Finally, the results of Saez (2002) cannot give any specific guidelines
for practical use of differential taxes on certain types of goods, because a gov-
ernment does not know enough about individual tastes of particular goods.
However, more about wealthy individuals’ tastes of certain kinds of commodi-
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ties can be easily known. This analysis is based on conspicuous consumption in
which individuals engage to flaunt their wealth. Since the rich spend relatively
more on positional goods to enhance their social positions, this paper could
provide useful insights to set differential commodity taxes on certain types of
goods.
On the same separable-utility assumption as used in Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976), Christiansen (1984), and Saez (2002), I show that the revenue-
neutral shift in the tax-mix away from nonlinear income taxes towards positional-
good taxes enhances welfare. Hence, an optimal tax structure should have dif-
ferential taxes on positional goods together with nonlinear income taxes. On
the other hand, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Christiansen (1984), and Saez
(2002) insist that the differential commodity taxes cannot supplement the
nonlinear income taxes and, thus, are necessary for the optimal tax structure.
Furthermore, I find that differential taxes on positional goods are required to
some extent, even if demands for positional goods are positively related to
labor supply. In this case, Christiansen (1984) suggests negative commodity
taxes or subsidies, however.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a
status-seeking game that can be used to examine an optimal tax system in the
presence of status effect. Section 3 solves a two-stage optimization problem,
explains individual behaviors in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and gives an
optimal income taxes without any commodity taxes. In section 4, I explore
total welfare effect of the marginal revision in positional-good taxes. I offer
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concluding remarks in the final section.
2.2 Model environment
Consider an economy that has a unit measure of individuals who are







θ ≥ 0 is given to an individual. The upper and lower bars
stand for maximum and minimum levels, respectively. Each individual learns
his or her own ability of work, whereas the others cannot know it. That is, one’s
work ability is unobservable and thus becomes private information. However,
all of the individuals have common knowledge of the ability distribution in
this economy, represented by a twice continuously differentiable distribution
function G (·) on the ability set Θ, and g (θ) := dG/dθ is the probability
density function. Work ability is assumed to be equal to wage rate, since it
implies labor productivity.
An individual who devotes his or her work hours l to the labor market
at a given wage rate θ earns a gross income i := θl. The time endowment is
normalized at one (hence, l + L = 1 with L denoting leisure). When a tax
authority in this society sets an income tax schedule T (i, s), disposable income
becomes z := i − T (i, s). The shift parameter s determines the shape of the
income tax function. The individual takes this parameter as a given, since it is
a choice variable of the tax authority. Now, disposable income is divided into
two kinds of consumable goods, x and y, each of which can be distinguished
42
from the other by some characteristics, and the budget constraint is
qxx+ qyy = z (2.1)
where qx := px + tx and qy := py + ty. The tax rates and producer prices on
goods are denoted by t and p, with each subscript indicating one of two goods.
Hence, q means the after-tax commodity prices.
Using the terminology of Frank (1985), the above consumption goods
are classified into two types, positional goods and nonpositional goods. The
positional good x is so visible that it carries social status to certain individuals.
The consumption of a positional good is referred to as conspicuous consump-
tion. In contrast, the consumption of nonpositional good y does not affect
one’s status because others cannot directly observe it. Adopting the formula-
tions of Frank (1985), Robson (1992), and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), I
assume that an individual’s social status is determined not only by his or her
consumption level of the positional good but also others’ as follows:




f (x′) dx′ (2.2)
where F (·) is the distribution function of positional goods in this economy,
and f (·) is its probability density function. Each individual has an incentive
to consume a higher amount of the positional good and in turn seek a higher
status than others, since the value of F (x) is increasing in his or her own
consumption level of x but decreasing in others’. The person with the lowest
positional good level
¯
x earns the rank of r. Therefore, the parameter r, which
is assumed to be positive or zero, becomes the lowest status in this society.
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I assume that all individuals have the following identical utility func-
tion:
U (x, y, l, R (x, F (·))) := u (x, y, l)R (x, F (·)) (2.3)
where the conventional utility index u (·) ≥ 0 is a twice differentiable function
which is strictly increasing and quasiconcave in two goods x and y, but strictly
decreasing and quasiconvex in hours of work l. In eq. (2.3), the conventional
utility function and the above status function enter multiplicatively into the
utility function U (·). Hence, each individual faces a trade-off between a higher
status and a lower direct utility when raising budget share of positional goods
but reducing that of nonpositional goods.
In this society, the government has a revenue requirement. To main-
tain constituent welfare at a particular level, the government must finance a
constant expenditure E by income taxation or commodity taxation. Then the
government budget constraint becomes∫
Θ
T (i, s) dG+
∫
Θ
(txx+ tyy) dG = E (2.4)
where I normalize the population size at unity.3 Since the purpose of the
present analysis is to investigate the welfare effect of a revenue-neutral shift
in the tax mix away from income tax and toward tax on positional goods,
I exploit the analytical method as presented in Christiansen (1984). When








χ (θ) g (θ) dθ for any χ (·) on Θ.
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commodity taxes, the shift parameter s and some arbitrary function ζ (·) can
generally rewrite the income tax function as T (i, s) := T ∗ (i) + s · ζ (i) and
easily define any shift from the optimal income taxes. The value of s should
be zero at the optimum.
I define a social welfare function W (·) that includes all possible redis-
tributive tastes of the government as
W (qx, qy, s) :=
∫
Θ
ω (θ)u (x, y, l)R (x, F (·)) dG (2.5)
in which the function ω (·) on Θ is such that
∫
Θ
ω (θ) dθ = 1, and then ω (θ)
is the social weight on individuals with a wage rate θ ∈ Θ. Given a certain
redistributive object, the level of social welfare varies according to the alterna-
tive tax system because individuals alter their consumption and labor supply
behaviors. Thus, the government will design a tax structure that minimizes
tax distortions.
2.3 Status-seeking game and income taxation
Before proceeding, it could be helpful to explain the timing of decisions
by both individuals and government. As in Christiansen (1984) and Saez
(2002), I decompose the individual maximization problem into two stages.4
At the first stage, all individuals engage in the status-seeking game, and they
noncooperatively decide their demands for positional and nonpositional goods
4The two-stage optimization is equivalent to the original one, even though this analysis
is in the context of a simultaneous game.
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— conditional to their hours of work. Then the individuals move on to the
second stage and choose their hours of work — conditional to the income
tax function that the government imposes. Embodying individual demands
for two goods and labor supplies in its constraints, the government optimally
chooses a tax function at the end of this section.
2.3.1 Noncooperative demands for goods
This subsection derives the conditional demands for positional and non-
positional goods when hours of work l are considered as fixed. Regarding the
after-tax prices qx and qy on two consumption goods, hours of work l, and dis-
posable income z as given exogenously at this stage, each individual chooses an
amount of positional good x and a level of nonpositional good y to maximize




u (x, y, l) (r + F (x)) (2.6)
s.t. qxx+ qyy = z.
In eq. (2.6), the individual choice of positional good interrelates with those of
the others by the distribution of positional goods in this society. Hence, the
distribution function F (·) will be determined endogenously in the model.
Since they are identical in all respects but differ only in wage rate, all in-
dividuals decide a symmetric Nash equilibrium demand function for positional
goods, such that x = x (G (θ)) for each original rank G (θ) in the exogenously
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given wage-rate hierarchy [0, 1]. Assume for the moment that the equilibrium
demand function x (·) is differentiable and strictly increasing. An individual
with a relatively higher rank of wage rate has relatively more expenditure for
positional goods in this society. Thus, the probability that an individual with
an original wage-rate rank G (θ) consumes the positional good at a higher
level than a randomly chosen individual with a rank G (θ′) from the society is
rewritten as
F (x) = P {θ′ ∈ Θ : x(G (θ′)) ≤ x} = P
{














= x−1 (x) for any x (2.7)
where the superscript −1 indicates the inverse of a given function. Eq. (2.7)
equates the distribution function F (·) of positional goods with the inverse
x−1 (·) of an equilibrium demand function for positional goods.
Substituting eq. (2.7) into the individual maximization problem (2.6),
we have the following Lagrange expression:
L (x, y, µ; qx, qy, l, z) = u (x, y, l)
(
r + x−1 (x)
)
+ µ (z − qxx− qyy) . (2.8)
Setting the partial derivatives of the Lagrange (2.8) equal to zero yields the
first-order conditions:
Lx = ux (x, y, l)
(
r + x−1 (x)
)
+ u (x, y, l)
∂ (x−1 (x))
∂x
− µqx = 0, (2.9)
Ly = uy (x, y, l)
(
r + x−1 (x)
)
− µqy = 0, (2.10)
Lµ = 0 : z − qxx− qyy = 0.
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Note that x = x (G (θ)) for each G (θ) ∈ [0, 1] in a symmetric equilibrium.
Then eq. (2.7) gives the following equalities:
F (x) = x−1 (x) = G (θ) for each θ ∈ Θ in equilibrium. (2.11)
Hence, each individual rank in the distribution of positional goods becomes
equal to the original rank in the wage-rate distribution in this society. That is,
once all individuals noncooperatively determine their demands for positional
goods, they learn that their status is at the same position as in the exogenously
given wage-rate hierarchy. Plugging eq. (2.11) into eqs. (2.9) and (2.10) can
rewrite the first order conditions at the noncooperative equilibrium as
Lx = ux (x, y, l) (r +G (θ)) + u (x, y, l)
∂G (θ)
∂x
− µqx = 0, (2.12)
Ly = uy (x, y, l) (r +G (θ))− µqy = 0, (2.13)
Lµ = 0 : z − qxx− qyy = 0. (2.14)
Using eqs. (2.12) and (2.13), we arrive at the tangency condition:
ux (x, y, l)
uy (x, y, l)
+
u (x, y, l)







The first term in eq. (2.15) is the marginal rate of substitution between x and
y for the standard maximization problem of the consumer. But the condition
includes another term that implies an additional marginal return to the con-
sumption of x, since the positional good carries social status. Each individual
has relatively less expenditure for nonpositional goods and relatively more for
positional goods due to this additional positive return. Such noncooperative
equilibrium demands for goods are inefficient in terms of conventional utility.
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From the collective point of view, the indirect return to conspicuous
consumption is undesirable in eq. (2.15). Following the cooperative case that
Frank (1985) formulates in this context, I pose the maximization problem of







(r +G (θ)) (2.16)
s.t.qxx̃+ qyỹ = z̃
where the tilde ∼ on a variable stands for cooperative case. In optimizing
utility, each individual takes status as the originally given position in the
wage-rate distribution. Hence, cooperative utility maximization in eq. (2.16)











Eq. (2.17) eliminates the spurious return that eq. (2.15) takes in the nonco-
operative case. The marginal rate of substitution between x and y is equal to
the relative price qx/qy. Thus, the cooperative equilibrium demands for goods
are efficient in terms of conventional utility.
Now, replacing for y using eq. (2.14), the tangency condition (2.15) in



































= ξ (x,G (θ) ; qx, qy, z, l) . (2.18)
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Using the cooperative demand for positional good x̃, we have the boundary




θ/qx if r = 0
x̃ with G (
¯
θ) = 0 if r > 0.
(2.19)
The poorest individuals with rank G (
¯
θ) = 0 spend all income on the posi-
tional good, if the bottom of status r is zero in this society. That is the only
way in which an individual increases utility, since that person’s equilibrium
utility u (x (0) , y (0) , l)G (
¯
θ) is zero. On the other hand when r is positive, an
individual demand for positional goods is the same as in the cooperative case.
That is, an individual consumes the positional good without any interest in
status seeking.
Given the values of qx, qy, z, and l, the differential equation (2.18) with
the boundary condition (2.19) forms the equilibrium demand for positional
goods that is differentiable and strictly increasing in wage-rate ranking G (θ).5
Thus, the solution to the differential equation, together with eqs. (2.13) and
(2.14), yields the demands for two goods and the Lagrangian multiplier in the
following forms:
x = x (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) (2.20)
y = y (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) (2.21)
µ = µ (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) . (2.22)
5This paper does not focus on the formal proof. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for
details in the context of the status-seeking game, however.
50
Consequently, we write the corresponding indirect utility function, conditional
on hours of work l, as
v (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) (r +G (θ)) =u (x (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) , y (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) , l)
×
(
r + x−1 (x (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)))
)
(2.23)
where the conventional indirect utility function is written as v(qx, qy, z, l, G(θ))
:= u(x, y, l), and r + x−1(x) = r + G(θ) in equilibrium. Furthermore, the
envelope theorem gives the following properties:
vqx (r +G (θ)) = −µx (2.24)
vqy (r +G (θ)) = −µy (2.25)
vz (r +G (θ)) = µ (2.26)
vl = ul (2.27)
vG(θ) (r +G (θ)) + v = 0 (2.28)
in which a subscript on a function stands for a partial derivative with respect
to it.
2.3.2 Labor supplies
In this subsection, second-stage optimization decides the hours of work
l that have been treated as fixed until now. Also, gross and disposable incomes
i = θl and z = i− T (i, s) are determined as a consequence. Regarding after-
tax prices qx and qy on two consumption goods, shift parameter s in the income
tax function, and wage rate θ as exogenously given, each individual chooses
51
hours of work l to maximize the indirect utility index in eq. (2.23) as follows:
max
l
v (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) (r +G (θ)) (2.29)
s.t. z = i− T (i, s)
i = θl.
This optimization reads the first-order condition as
dv
dl
= [vz (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) (1− Ti (i, s)) θ + vl (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ))]
× (r +G (θ)) = 0, (2.30)
and the second-order condition as d2v/dl2 < 0.
To investigate incentives to labor supplies in this status-seeking game,
we have two tangency conditions for the noncooperative and cooperative cases
as follows:6
−ux (x, y, l)
ul (x, y, l)
− u (x, y, l)
















(1− Ti (̃ı, s)) θ
. (2.32)
In the noncooperative case (2.31), the marginal rate of substitution between
the positional good x and leisure L (= 1 − l) is less than the relative price
qx/ (1− Ti (i, s)) θ. In contrast, the cooperative case (2.32) equates the marginal
rate of substitution between x̃ and L̃ with qx/ (1− Ti (̃ı, s)) θ. If an individual
6First, substitute eqs. (2.26) and (2.27) into eq. (2.30) to have −ul(r + G(θ)) = µ(1 −
Ti(i, s))θ. Using this equation together with eq. (2.12), we arrive at eq. (2.31).
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with wage rate θ faces the same marginal tax rate (Ti (i, s) = Ti (̃ı, s)), and
consumes both goods at equal levels in both cases (x = x̃ and y = ỹ), then
the marginal rate of substitution is less in the noncooperative case than in
the cooperative one due to the positive additional return to positional goods.
Thus, L < L̃ (or l > l̃), because the price of leisure is relatively more expen-
sive in the noncooperative case. That is, seeking status through conspicuous
consumption provides incentives to labor supplies in a society.
From the first-order condition (2.30), we obtain work hours and dispos-
able income in the following forms:7
l = l (qx, qy, s, θ) (2.33)
z = z (qx, qy, s, θ) (2.34)
Plugging eqs. (2.33) and (2.34) into eq. (2.23) rewrites the indirect utility
function as
V (qx, qy, s, θ) (r +G (θ))
= v (qx, qy, z (qx, qy, s, θ) , l (qx, qy, s, θ) , G (θ)) (r +G (θ)) (2.35)
where V (qx, qy, s, θ) := v (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)). Note that given qx, qy, and s, the
indirect utility in eq. (2.35) is a function of wage rate θ only.
7The hours of work l actually depends on the rank G (θ) in the distribution of wage rates:
l = l′(qx, qy, s, θ,G(θ)). Since l′(qx, qy, s, θ,G(θ)) = l(qx, qy, s, θ), we can arrive at eq. (2.33),
however.
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2.3.3 Optimal income taxes
Since the analysis investigates the welfare effect of a marginal increase in
tax on positional goods at the optimal level of income tax T ∗ (i), characterizing
the shape of the optimal income tax in detail is not of concern. Thus, this
subsection focuses only on the condition that characterizes the optimal income
tax without any commodity taxes, and the parametric optimization is enough
to accomplish that. Thus, the government chooses shift parameter s in the
income tax function to optimize social welfare in eq. (2.5), subject to the
government budget constraint in eq. (2.4), as follows:
max
s




T (i, s) dG+
∫
Θ
(txx+ tyy) dG = E
tx = ty = 0. (2.36)
This government optimization yields the first-order condition:





(Ti (i, s) θls + Ts (i, s)) dG = 0 (2.37)
where the Lagrange multiplier λ = −WE is evaluated at the optimum. Hence,
we get the condition (2.37) that characterizes the optimal income tax T ∗ (i)
for each i, if the shift parameter s is zero.
2.4 The welfare effect of conspicuous consumption taxes
To explore the total welfare effect of a revenue-neutral change in the
tax mix away from income tax and toward tax on conspicuous consumption,
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the economy is assumed to be in such a state that the government sets an
income tax optimally and does not levy on consumable goods. That is, this
analysis starts at an initial equilibrium with an existing optimal income tax
(s = 0), but without any commodity taxes (tx = ty = 0), and then introduces
a small tax dtx on conspicuous consumption. Differentiating the social welfare
function (2.5) totally and substituting the first-order condition (2.37) that


















(Tiθls + Ts) dG
]
ds.
The left-hand side of eq. (2.38) is the dollar value of the change in social
welfare (dW/λ). Since I explore a change in the tax mix, I assume that the
government does not change the public expenditure (dE = 0). Differentiating
the government budget constraint (2.4) totally and evaluating s, tx, and ty
with zero in turn yield[∫
Θ










dtx = 0. (2.39)












Tiθ (ltx − ls) dG. (2.40)
The left-hand side of eq. (2.40) is the total welfare change in terms of dollar
value when the government imposes a small tax change dtx on conspicuous
consumption. The first term implies the change in tax burden, and the second
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and third terms represent the change in total revenue on the right-hand side
of eq. (2.40). Hence, the total welfare change is divided into these two terms.
The next step is to evaluate the change in tax burden on the right-hand
side of eq. (2.40). From eq. (2.35), the social welfare function is given as
W (qx, qy, s) =
∫
Θ
ω (θ)V (qx, qy, s, θ) (r +G (θ)) dG. (2.41)
Differentiating the social welfare function (2.41) partially with respect to qx













ω (θ) vz (r +G (θ))
λ
)
(Ts − x) dG
which is applied with two equalities that Vqx = vqx = −xvz and Vs = −vzTs
from eqs. (2.24), (2.26), and (2.30). Plugging eq. (2.42) into eq. (2.40) rewrites
















Tiθ (ltx − ls) dG. (2.43)
Following the analytical method that Christiansen (1984) uses, I define the
marginal shift as Ts (i, s) = ζ (i) = x. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, each
individual choice ultimately depends on the wage rate θ only. Therefore, the
equilibrium demand for positional goods is described as x = x (θ) for each θ ∈
Θ. Since gross income i is strictly increasing in θ, we can rewrite the wage rate
as θ = θ (i) for all i. Substituting this function of wage rate into x (θ) yields
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the equilibrium demand for positional goods as a function of income — that is,
x (θ) = x (θ (i)). Hence, the income tax function T (i, s) = T ∗ (i) + s · x (θ (i))
is well defined for all levels of gross income i, since the equilibrium demand for
positional goods x is expressed for all levels of gross income i. The first term






Tiθ (ltx − ls) dG. (2.44)
Since the per-hour income tax Tiθ is positive, the sign of the term (ltx − ls)
determines the total welfare effect of marginal tax dtx on positional goods.
The final step is to assess the sign of the term (ltx − ls) in the total
welfare change (2.44). Differentiating the first-order condition for hours of
























ls+ (vzz (−Ts) (1− Ti) θ + vz (−Tis) θ + vlz (−Ts))
× (r +G (θ)) = 0. (2.46)
Subtracting eq. (2.46) from eq. (2.45), we have the difference between the
changes in work hours, with respect to the tax on positional goods and the
shift parameter in the income tax function, as follows:





× ((vzqx + vzzTs) (1− Ti) θ + vlqx + vlzTs + vzTisθ) . (2.47)
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The defined marginal shift Ts (i, s) = x, together with eqs. (2.24) and (2.26),
gives the following relationship:
Ts (i, s) = x (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ)) = −
vqx (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ))
vz (qx, qy, z, l, G (θ))
. (2.48)
Plugging the above equalities (2.48) into eq. (2.47) and dividing this result by
vz, we have
ltx − ls =
(




















Differentiating the demand for positional good x in eq. (2.48) partially with
















Using eq. (2.50) and the fact that Tis = Tsi = ∂x/∂i, we rewrite the equation
(2.49) as
ltx − ls =
(





θ − xz (1− Ti) θ − xl
)
. (2.51)
Since the wage rate θ can be expressed as a function of gross income i, dis-
posable income z = z (θ) and hours of work l = l (θ) are also functions of
gross income i. This fact yields the derivative of the equilibrium demand for
positional goods with respect to gross income i as
∂x
∂i








Replacing eq. (2.52) into eq. (2.51) and using the relationship that 1−θ∂l/∂i =
ldθ/di > 0 from the definition of gross income i = θl, we arrive at
ltx − ls =
(


































where T ∗ is an optimal tax (i.e., T (i, s) = T ∗ (i) for s = 0). Note that all





, and dθ/di are positive in eq. (2.54). Moreover,
the term xG(θ)g (θ) (θ/l) is also positive, since the marginal effect of an in-
crease in original wage-rate rank on demand for positional goods is always
positive (xG(θ) > 0). Therefore, the total welfare change becomes positive,
if the marginal effect of an increase in work hours on demand for positional
goods is zero (xl = 0). This case is true when the conventional utility function
u (x, y, l) is weakly separable between hours of work l and demand for posi-
tional good x.8 If the demand for a positional good is unrelated to hours of
work, then the shift in tax mix away from the income tax and toward the tax
on positional goods increases social welfare. This statement implies that the
tax on a positional good is desirable even when the preexisting income tax is
optimal. In other words, both a differential tax on conspicuous consumption
goods and an income tax constitute the optimal tax system in the presence of
a status effect. Even if the demand for positional goods is positively related to
8See Christiansen (1984) for the proof.
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hours of work (i.e., xl > 0), the differential tax on a conspicuous consumption
good can supplement the income tax to some extent.
2.5 Conclusion
The previous section observes a positive welfare effect when a gov-
ernment conducts a small change in conspicuous consumption tax under its
revenue requirement. With a conventional utility function separable between
positional goods and hours of work, I infer that the optimal tax system needs
a supplementary tax on positional goods together with an income tax. The
result is based on the assumption that the preexisting income tax is at an
optimal level. Kaplow (2006) notes that the preexisting income tax may not
be optimal in reality. Then he shows that commodity taxation is undesirable,
even in this case. Commodity taxation would still be desirable with consump-
tion externality, however, even if the income tax is not at an optimal level.
This analysis identifies that the optimal income tax cannot correct the distor-
tion from status-seeking behaviors by itself. Hence, a suboptimal income tax
could leave the distortion at a higher level than an optimal one. In turn, the
result of this paper would be consistent even when the preexisting income tax
is not optimal.
I have demonstrated that a marginal tax increase on positional goods
enhances each individual’s conventional utility for any distribution of wage
rates. Generally, individuals with the same wage rates have different utility
levels in two societies that differ in the distribution of wage rates, however,
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since the equilibrium demand for positional goods varies according to the shape
of the distribution. Thus, the alternative distributions of wage rates in two so-
cieties generate different social welfare effects of the marginal tax on positional
goods. A comparison of social welfare effects in two societies would be mean-
ingful for future research. This comparative statics could provide insight into
the change in differential commodity tax, either as a society achieves higher




Capital Mobility, Growth, and Environment:
“Race to the Bottom”
3.1 Introduction
Compared to the past, economic interdependence has gradually in-
creased in recent years. The stock of capital as a factor of production (e.g.,
factory or machinery) does not need to be invested in a particular region.
Many regional economies have achieved successful economic growth with a
higher capital mobility. But, many environmentalists are concerned that the
regions with a rapid growth rate experience many localized environmental ex-
ternalities. An example is deforestation. If a higher capital mobility generates
severe interregional competition, less stringent local standards could deterio-
rate the local environments. However, the increasing capital mobility might
give both a higher economic growth and a better environment, if each local-
ity is concerned with its environmental externality and sets an environmental
measure according to its own interest. Therefore, ones may be somewhat con-
fused about how the increasing economic integration affects the local economic
development and environment.
The literature on local public finance and environmental economics
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gives two opposite conclusions on the “race to the bottom” in environmental
standards. This hypothesis states that severe economic competition among
local authorities will result in lower levels of environmental quality. Thus,
federal government intervention is necessary to preserve local environments.
Markusen et al. (1995) show that noncooperative behaviors of two regions
generate welfare loss in a model with an endogenous plant location. On the
other hand, it is also argued that each local jurisdiction could achieve an
efficient environmental regulation by itself. Using a simple static model with
interjurisdictional competition, Oates and Schwab (1988) contend that the
local setting of environmental standards is globally optimal in the jurisdictions
homogenous in workers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the increasing capital
mobility impacts regional economic growth and environment. To answer the
question, I develop an endogenous growth model in which each local govern-
ment competes against the others to induce imperfectly mobile stock of capital
into its region. Then I form a conclusion on the hypothesis above. Comparing
three alternative policy systems between a federation and local jurisdictions,
this paper presents the welfare implication, and it suggests which policy struc-
ture is better for regional development and environment preservation with the
increasing capital mobility.
This paper contributes to the literature on interjurisdictional competi-
tion and growth theory as follows. It extends the issues of fiscal or regulatory
policy competition to a dynamic framework. It develops an endogenous growth
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model with an imperfect capital mobility and local environments. Most pre-
vious studies employed static models to address the issues of decentralized
environmental regulations. Hence, they do not consider dynamic features of
capital as a stock variable. As the stock of capital accumulates over time,
the amount of pollution with no abatement activities grows at a positive rate.
For a local economy to have a perpetual growth with a stable level of en-
vironmental quality, some forms of abatement activities should be present.1
This paper uses a public expenditure as the abatement activity as in Smulders
and Gradus (1996). Also, the accumulated stock of capital creates a positive
externality on productivity growth in regional economies. In a particular re-
gion into which relatively more amounts of capital stock are induced, the local
residents provide more productive labor supply to local production because
of learning effects from investment activities of capital owners as in Arrow
(1962). This technological change on labor productivity is incorporated in the
model of this paper. Second, following the formulation of capital mobility as
in Rauscher (2005), this paper uses the full range of capital mobility such that
the stock of capital gets from perfectly immobile to perfect mobile. The scope
of previous literature is limited to distortion-inducing or efficiency-enhancing
arguments with a fixed capital mobility as in Oates and Schwab (1988) and
Kunce and Shogren (2005). However, this adoption of capital mobility allows
1The literature on the endogenous growth and environmental economics has addressed
how an economy can achieve sustainable growth with a stable level of environmental qual-
ity. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) develop a two sector endogenous growth model with
pollution-augmenting technology that helps the pollution be used more effectively over time.
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us to analyze the impact of amalgamation on local policy variables, as if the
economic integration had been increased. Moreover, all the federal and local
policy variables are endogenized in this model. In order to look at the im-
plication of distortionary tax, the previous papers usually specify the policy
instruments of an upper level of government as exogenous as in Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Rauscher (2005). But, an upper level of government
could respond to the policies set by the lower levels of government in the real
policy system, as is done in the United States.
For a given level of capital mobility, the local jurisdictions with a full
range of local policies (i.e. no federal intervention) achieve a sustainable eco-
nomic development. An increase in capital mobility generates “tax importing”
due to which each locality experiences a higher growth rate and more degraded
environment. That is, the increasing mobility dampens the capital tax and
transfers the burden of pollution abatement to the locality. The capital tax
rate is negative and the local environment is deteriorated completely at the
perfect capital mobility. This finding supports the hypothesis of “race to the
bottom” in environmental standards. This paper also identifies that the in-
creasing capital mobility raises a higher growth rate, but it reduces the overall
welfare of residents. To avoid the cut-throat competition and preserve regional
environments, an upper level of government must intervene to save the single
jurisdictions.2 An uniform environmental standard and a requirement of lump
sum transfer (or tax) are considered as the federal interventions in this model.
2Cumberland (1979, 1981) suggests the uniformly minimum environmental standards.
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Both of two optimal interventions improve the residents’ welfare. The opti-
mal uniform environmental standard is independent of any capital mobility,
so that it prevents local environment from degradation by the increasing cap-
ital mobility (or severe regional competition). However, the optimal transfer
(or tax) requirement degrades the environmental quality more if the resident’s
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one, even though it se-
cures a consumption level for the local residents against the increasing capital
mobility.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present an en-
dogenous growth model with interjurisdictional fiscal competition. Section 3
employs majority voting to solve for local decisions and then examines whether
the local jurisdictions “race to the bottom or the top” in environmental stan-
dards. In section 4, two federal interventions are endogenized in the model. I
investigate how the optimal interventions affect the local environmental qual-
ity and economic growth. The final section concludes and suggests future
research.
3.2 The model
Assume that a federation consists of infinitely small identical jurisdic-
tions, and each local jurisdiction has many atomistic profit-maximizing firms
which take the role of local production. In the model, the federation is repre-
sented as a unit real plane [0, 1]× [0, 1] in which a firm i of a jurisdiction j is
expressed as one specific point (i, j) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. In each jurisdiction, two
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types of agents, called capitalist and worker, live on the infinite horizon. The
members in each group are homogenous and large in number.3 At each time,
the capitalists can save but cannot work, while the workers consume all the
earned incomes with no saving.4 As local production factors, the capital stock
that is a forgone consumption is imperfectly mobile, but the labor is immobile
across jurisdictions.
3.2.1 Local environmental quality
The capital stock Kj invested in a local jurisdiction j generates pollu-
tion Pj through a production process. The pollution as an externality is ‘bad’
for the residents in the jurisdiction.5 If a higher level of capital is located in the
jurisdiction, the residents consume a lower level of local environmental quality.
However, the local pollution can be reduced by public abatement activities Gj
which is financed with a tax on capital by the authority of the jurisdiction. If
the jurisdiction decides on more public expenditure for abatement activities,
the capital stock induced in the jurisdiction deteriorates the local environment
less. Thus, the local environmental quality of jurisdiction j at each time is
3Here, the workers are homogenous as wage earners. However, the paper extends the
model to include non-wage workers whose circumstances and interests are different from
those of wage workers.
4Judd (1985), Lejour and Verbon (1997), and Rauscher (2005) make this assumption.
5Local residents have disutility from pollution as a negative externality, so that the
pollution is incorporated into the utility function. We could include the negative externality
in the production function as well as the utility function, however. The pollution could have
a negative effect on production if lower environmental quality creates less productivity as
in Smulders and Gradus (1996) and Bovenberg and Smulders (1995). However, this aspect
does not make any significant difference, even though this analysis does not consider it
formally.
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where χ is a positive elasticity of pollution with respect to the capital-abatement
ratio.6 In eq. (3.1), the pollution is increasing in attracted stock of capital and
decreasing in public abatement activities in jurisdiction j: ∂Pj/∂Kj > 0,
∂Pj/∂Gj < 0. Assume further that a polluting emission generated in one
jurisdiction doesn’t have a spillover effect on another. Therefore, the local
environment is modeled as a purely public good that can be consumed within
a particular jurisdiction.
3.2.2 Production technology
At each point in time t ∈ [0,∞), many atomistic profit-maximizing
firms take the role of local production.7 In order to produce a private good
Yij that is sold in the national markets, each firm i in jurisdiction j employs
stock of capital Kij and labor Lij and use the following form of production
technology







6The public expenditure Gj as pollution abatement activities as well as the pollution Pj
are modeled as flow variables, e.g. filters used up within one period. Hence, in order to
preserve a stable level of environmental quality, the public goods should be provided in each
period. Modeling pollution or public abatement activities as stock values make this analysis
difficult without critical different results along a balanced growth path.
7In order to reduce complication and save simplicity, the model omits the notation of
time t on variable.
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which exhibits conventional constant returns to scale in two factors of pro-
duction, capital stock and labor. In eq. (3.2), the production technology is
concave and strictly increasing in capital and labor, and shows the normal
monotonicity: ∂Y/∂Kij > 0 > ∂
2Y/∂K2ij, ∂Y/∂Lij > 0 > ∂
2Y/∂L2ij, and
∂2Y/∂Lij∂Kij > 0. Also, it satisfies the Inada conditions for the two argu-
ments: limKij→0 ∂Y/∂Kij = limLij→0 ∂Y/∂Lij =∞, and limKij→∞ ∂Y/∂Kij =
limLij→∞ ∂Y/∂Lij = 0.
In addition to the two production factors, the production function in-
cludes the aggregate level of capital stock Kj which implies a technological
progress of jurisdiction j at each point in time t. The technological advance is
considered as by-products when capitalists invest their stock of capital in the
jurisdiction. Through the technological diffusion as a positive externality of
capital stock, the local workers devote more effective labor to the local produc-
tion and, in turn, get higher wages as in Arrow (1962).8 Although it generates
a negative environmental externality, the aggregate capital stocks Kj induced
in the local production creates a positive externality on local workers’ produc-
tivity. Like a pure public good within its boundary, the positive externality
of one jurisdiction does not spill over to another. Hence, the level of labor
efficiency differs across jurisdictions if the total amount of capital stock in the
federation is distributed unevenly to each local jurisdiction over time.
8This type of technological advance is ‘labor-augmenting’ as in learning-by-doing models.
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3.2.3 Firms
Given a rental price of capital rj and a wage rate wj in the jurisdiction
j, each competitive firm i has a profit flow πij = Lij(F (kij, Kj) − rjkij −





constant returns to scale in the capital-labor ratio kij := Kij/Lij and the
aggregate capital stock Kj. A single firm is so small that its own contribution
to the aggregate capital stock of the jurisdiction is negligible. Hence, taken
the technological progress in the jurisdiction Kj as parametric and using the
zero-profit condition, the firms’ profit maximization gives the rental price of
capital and the wage rate where rj = ∂F (kij, Kj)/∂kij and wj = F (kij, Kj)−
kij∂F (kij, Kj)/∂kij. Hence, the capitalists who invest their stock of capital
into jurisdiction j earn a rate of return rj equal to the marginal product of
capital, and the workers who reside in the jurisdiction receive a wage rate wj
equal to marginal product of labor at each time t.
In each jurisdiction j, the aggregate level of capital stock and labor
supply are Kj =
∫ 1
0
Kij di and Lj =
∫ 1
0
Lij di, respectively. Assume that
the workers in a jurisdiction supply their labors inelastically and normalize
the aggregate labor supply Lj to one. Since in equilibrium, all firms in a
jurisdiction choose the same levels of capital and labor, Lij = Lj = 1 and
kij = Kj for each i, the equilibrium rental price of capital and the equilibrium
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wage rate of jurisdiction j is as follows:9
rj = αA (3.3)
wj = (1− α)AKj for any j. (3.4)
The wage rate received by the local workers in jurisdiction j is increasing in
the amount of capital stock attracted in the jurisdiction, whereas the rental
price of capital is constant over time. Thus, in order to raise the wage rate
of its workers as actual residents, each local government competes against the
rest to induce the scarce capital stocks of the federation by using its policy
variables at each time.
3.2.4 Capital mobility
Taking a rental price rj and a tax rate of capital τj, in jurisdiction j
as given, a representative capitalist who plans to invest his stock of capital in
jurisdiction j chooses a time path of consumption {Ccj}∞t=0 to maximize his






subject to his flow budget constraint
Ccj + K̇j = (rj − τj)Kj, (3.6)
9In equilibrium, Lj =
∫ 1
0
Lij di = Lij = 1 and in turn, Kj =
∫ 1
0
Kij di = Kij = Lijkij =
kij for all t.
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where a dot above a variable indicates the time derivative. The two parameters
ε and ρ stand for a constant relative risk aversion (or inverse of elasticity
of intertemporal substitution) and a rate of time preference of the capitalist
respectively. In eq. (3.5), the instantaneous utility function of capitalist does
not include the pollution generated in jurisdiction j (or the environmental
quality of the jurisdiction). Because a regional environment is modeled as
pure public good that can be consumed only within a particular region, the
capitalist whose domicile is not the jurisdiction j need not be concerned about
environmental quality of the jurisdiction when he invests his capital stock
in the region. Even though his home is in the jurisdiction j as his capital
location, the capitalist does not have to care about the environmental quality.
Since he is able to separate his own stock of capital physically and spatially,
the capitalist can leave the jurisdiction j with no relocation of the capital
stocks.10
Inserting the rental price of capital of jurisdiction j in eq. (3.3), the
maximization problem of the representative capitalist yields the capital accu-
mulation equation in jurisdiction j in equilibrium
K̇j = (1/ε)(αA− τj − ρ)Kj, (3.7)
when the capital stock is perfectly immobile.11 However, in the context of
interjurisdictional competition, the accumulation equation has to be modeled
10Actually, the model assumption of ‘infinitesimal’ local jurisdictions gives zero probability
on the event that a domicile and a investment location of a capitalist is identical.
11The Hamiltonian of the representative capitalist reads: Hc(Ccj ,Kj , νj) = (C1−εcj −
1)/(1− ε) + νj((rj − τj)Kj −Ccj). Differentiating this yields the first-order conditions with
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as a mobility of capital stock. As in Rauscher (2005), the capital mobility
term is augmented in eq. (3.7) as follows:




Kjdj is the total amount of capital stock, and rf is denoted as a
rate of return in the federation for each point in time.12 In eq. (3.8), the second
term shows a parameter φ ∈ [0,∞) that measures a degree of capital mobility.
If φ is zero, then capital stock is immobile across jurisdictions, and thus, eq.
(3.8) reduces to eq. (3.7). The larger the parameter φ is, the more increased
the capital mobility is. If φ tends to infinity, capital stock gets perfect mobility
across jurisdictions. The size of investment flow is represented as a function
ψ(Kj, Kf ) which is increasing in the capital stocks Kj in the jurisdiction itself
and total capital stocks Kf in the federation. Further, the function ψ is
assumed to be homogenous of degree one such that ψ(K,K) = K. Thus,
a jurisdiction j can induce outside capital stocks into its region by cutting its
capital tax rate, since the net rate of return in the jurisdiction is greater than
respect to the consumption Ccj , the capital stock Kj : C−εcj = νj and rj−τj = ρ− ν̇j/νj . The
first two conditions with eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) give the consumption growth rate of capitalist:
Ċcj/Ccj = (αA − τj − ρ)/ε. For a growth path to be balanced, the net rate of return of
capital, αA − τj , the capital tax rate τj should be constant over time. Thus, using the
budget constraint in eq. (3.6) together with the consumption growth rate, it is shown that
the capital and consumption grow at a same rate on the balanced growth path, and we
arrive at eq. (3.7).
12As mentioned by Rauscher (2005), this formulation for capital mobility is intuitive and
reasonable, whereas it is not derived explicitly by capitalists’ profit-maximizing behavior.
But, the formulation is easily applicable for analyzing the impact of the increased capital
mobility. Of course, there are other specifications as in Lejour and Verbon (1997) and
Hayashi (1982). But, the specifications seem to be not tractable or too complicated for the
analysis. See Rauscher (2005) for more discussion and details.
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in the rest (αA − τj > rf ).13 Furthermore, the lower capital tax rate also
raises the investment within the jurisdiction as seen in the first term in eq.
(3.8). Since an increase in capital stock yields a higher wage rate for workers
in eq. (3.4), local jurisdictions have incentives to reduce their capital tax rate
to attract the capital stocks of the federation.
3.2.5 Local residents
At each point in time, the infinitely-lived workers have utility from
consumption Cwj but disutility from polluting emission Pj in a jurisdiction j




e−δt U(Cwj, Pj) dt (3.9)







for 0 < σ < 1 and σ > 1,
lnCwj − η lnPj for σ = 1.
(3.10)
In eq. (3.9), the parameter δ denotes the rate of time preference of worker.
In eq. (3.10), two parameters σ and η represents the inverse of intertemporal
substitution and the weight for pollution respectively.14 Generally, the rate of
time preference and the inverse of intertemporal substitution for the workers
need not be the same as for the capitalists (i.e. δ 6= ρ and σ 6= ε). Eq.
13However, the after-tax rental price of capital in the jurisdiction j is equal to the rate of
return in the rest of federation in equilibrium, i.e. αA− τj = rf .
14For a balanced growth path to be optimal, an instantaneous utility function is required
to be an isoelastic form.
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(3.10) says that the instantaneous function is strictly concave and increasing
in private consumptions: ∂U/∂Cwj > 0 > ∂
2U/∂C2wj. But, it is decreasing
in the pollution generated in the jurisdiction j: ∂U/∂P < 0. Furthermore,
it satisfies the Inada conditions for consumption and environmental quality:
limCwj→0 UC = limPj→∞ UP =∞, and limCwj→∞ UC = limPj→0 UP = 0.15
To preserve a stable level of environmental quality, the authority of
jurisdiction j finances the public abatement activity Gj with the tax revenue
τjKj collected from capital stock induced in the jurisdiction. Then the net of
tax revenue (or a tax if it is negative), Tj = τjKj −Gj, is distributed equally
to all workers in the jurisdiction. Thus, each worker’s income consists of a
wage rate wj in eq. (3.4) and the tax revenues Tj at each point in time t. The
flow budget constraint for a representative worker is
Cwj = wj + Tj (3.11)
= (1− α)AKj + (τjKj −Gj).
Since the entry of more capital increases the wage rate of worker, each local
jurisdiction has an incentive to reduce its capital tax rate against the rest of
the federation to attract more mobile stock of capital. But, this lower capital
tax rate can cause the jurisdiction to provide a lower level of public good for
15In this model, the inverse of a pollution level is equivalent to a level of environmental
quality. Thus, zero pollution level that implies no production in the jurisdiction is equivalent
to the infinite level of environmental quality. Substitute the pollution function (3.1) into the
instantaneous utility function (3.10) to rewrite the following utility function of consumption
and environmental quality: U∗(C,G/K) = (C1−σ(G/K)χη(1−σ)−1)/(1−σ). Then the Inada
condition for environmental quality is limG/K→0 U∗G/K =∞ and limG/K→∞ U
∗
G/K = 0. This
requires the condition: χη(1− σ)− 1 < 0.
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pollution abatement, and thus, the local environment of the jurisdiction can
be more degraded.
3.3 Local outcomes with a full range of policies
This section examines the local setting with a full set of policy vari-
ables under no federal intervention. In other words, each single jurisdiction
determines, as its own policy instruments, a capital tax rate and a level of
local environmental quality.
3.3.1 Political mechanism
In order to investigate how an increased capital mobility impacts the lo-
cal setting of policies instruments, and in turn, on the growth performance, the
preservation of local environment, and welfare implication, the paper adopts a
majority-voting model as in Oates and Schwab (1988). It is assumed further
that capitalists who live in a particular jurisdiction vote with their feet as in
Tiebout (1956) and Rauscher (2005). The capitalists can reflect their prefer-
ences and interests on local political issues by leaving the jurisdiction, because
they are perfectly mobile in the sense that their own capital stocks can be
physically and spatially separated from themselves. The capitalists need not
choose a jurisdiction both for a home and an investment place. No matter
where they reside, they can relocate the capital stocks in any regions. Thus,
the capitalists are assumed not to participate in any local political issues in this
model. However, workers have to live where they work. The labor as a factor
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of production is not physically and spatially divisible from the workers. Con-
sequently, the workers become actual residents in a particular jurisdiction by
participating in the local political procedure, and thus, the local government
reflects only workers’ interests.16
3.3.2 Sustainable development
Since all workers are homogenous in a jurisdiction, the outcome of
a median voter is that of the maximization problem of the representative
worker. In each jurisdiction j, a representative worker chooses a time path
of capital tax rate, and public abatement good to maximize the discounted
life-time welfare (3.9) subject to the flow budget constraint (3.11), and the
accumulation equation of capital stock invested into the jurisdiction (3.8),
given the initial amount of capital stock K(0). The current-value Hamiltonian
for the maximization problem of the representative worker reads
Hw(τj, Gj, Kj, µj) = U((1− α)AKj + (τjKj −Gj), Pj)
+ µj((1/ε)(αA− τj − ρ)Kj + φ(αA− τj − rj)ψ(Kj, Kf )), (3.12)
where µj denote the costate variable associated with the accumulation equation
of capital stock invested in jurisdiction j (or the shadow price of capital stock).
16On the static model with interjurisdictional competition for a limited amount of capital
stock in a federation, Oates and Schwab (1988) consider workers with no capital stocks as
the residents of a particular jurisdiction.
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The ex-post equilibrium conditions are given by
rf = αA− τ, (3.13)
ψ(K,Kf ) = K, (3.14)
since all identical jurisdictions choose the same levels of endogenous variables:
τj = τ , Gj = G, Kj = K, Cwj = Cw, and µj = µ for all j.
17 Then the current-
value Hamiltonian (3.12) and eqs. (3.13) and (3.14) require the following first-
order conditions with respect to the capital tax τ , the public abatement good
G, the capital stock K, and the costate variable µ in equilibrium:





((1− α)A+ τ)UC − χ
P
K
UP + µ(αA− τ − ρ)/ε = δµ− µ̇, (3.17)
K̇ = (1/ε)(αA− τ − ρ)K. (3.18)




e−δt µ(t)K(t) = 0, (3.19)
which guarantees that the consumption Cw and the capital stock K remain
bounded at infinity.18






dj = K since Kj = K for all j. Thus, the federal
level of capital stock of the federation is the same as that of any jurisdiction: Kf = K = Kj
for all j. This fact together with the assumption that ψ is homogenous of degree implies
that ψ(Kj ,Kf ) = ψ(K,K) = K.
18This condition is necessary for the representative worker’s problem if her instantaneous
utility is bounded.
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Eq. (3.20) shows that under a full set of policy instruments, each local jurisdic-
tion efficiently provides its environmental quality as local public good since the
marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal utility of abatement.
Taking log and differentiating eq. (3.15) with respect to time and sub-


















+ η(1− 1/σ) Ṗ
P
(3.21)
which describes the optimal consumption of the workers in each jurisdiction
over time for a given capital mobility. The last term of eq. (3.21) disappears,
if the level of pollution is constant over time (that is, the capital stock K
and public abatement activity G grow at a same rate) or an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1/σ equals unity). The term (A − G/K − ρ)/ε +
φ((1− α)A+ τ −G/K) represents the rate of return to capital stock induced
to each jurisdiction with respect to the point of worker’s view. The rate of
return to capital is divided by two terms. The first term (A − G/K − ρ)/ε
is the rate of return at zero capital mobility while the second term φ((1 −
α)A + τ − G/K) is the rate of return at a positive capital mobility which
implies an externality of mobile stock of capital across jurisdictions. Given
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a constant level of pollution, the consumption growth rate of local worker is
positive, zero, or negative if the rate of return to capital is larger than, equal
to, or smaller than the rate of time preference for the worker. In addition,
all other things being unchanged, the worker’s consumption grows faster for
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution smaller than one if the growth rate
of pollution is larger. In the opposite case, the consumption grows slower for
either of an intertemporal elasticity larger than unity or a negative growth
rate of pollution.
Next, it is shown that all variables grow at a constant rate γ along
a balanced growth path. By taking logs and differentiating eq. (3.20) with
respect to time, the consumption Cw and the public abatement activity G grow
at the same rate. For the growth path to be balanced, the the rate of return
to capital in the federation is constant over time, and in turn, the capital tax
rate τ is constant over time. Then substitute the ratio of consumption relative
to capital from eq. (3.20) into the flow budget constraint of worker (3.11),
and take logs and differentiate with respect to time to imply that the capital
K and the abatement activity G grow at the same rate. Consequently, the
transfer of net tax revenues T and the capital K grow at the same rate. Since
the ratio of abatement relative to capital are constant, pollution P is constant
as well. Thus, along a balanced growth path equilibrium, the stock of capital
K, the consumption Cw of workers, and the abatement activities G of local
government grow at the positive constant rate γ, but the capital tax rate τ
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and the pollution amount P grow at a zero rate:19













= (αA− τ − ρ)/ε. (3.23)
Proposition 3.3.1 (sustainable growth). Given a capital mobility φ ∈ [0,∞),
each local jurisdiction achieves sustainable growth with a stable level of local
environmental quality. That is, the growth rate of workers’ consumption is
positive, while the growth rate of regional pollution is zero over time.
3.3.3 The impact of increased capital mobility
To characterize the outcome of local setting of policy instruments and
analyze the impact of increased capital mobility in a simplified framework,
denote the abatement and the consumption relative to capital as fundamental
variables that are constant on the balanced growth path as g := G/K and
c := C/K. In addition,





19It is obvious that modeling pollution as a flow variable gives a simplified framework,
but it does not modify the qualitative results along a balanced growth path. If the local
environment of each jurisdiction were modeled as a renewable resource as in Bovenberg
and Smulders (1995), pollution could not grow over time, since it should not exceed the
regeneration capacity of natural environment for a balanced growth path to be sustainable.
This is in accordance with the formulation of this model. In order to stabilize pollution, an
endogenously growing jurisdiction can provide an increasing number of public abatement
activities.
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which is decreasing in φ, and has the upper bound of unity, ∆0(x) = 1, at the
zero mobility and the lower bound of zero, ∆∞(x) = limφ→∞∆φ(x) = 0, at
the perfect mobility respectively for any positive value x ∈ R+ := (0,∞).
Then eqs. (3.11), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), and (3.23) give the reduced forms of
solutions as follows:20
γ =
A− ρ− (1 + χη)c̄w∆φ(κ)
ε
, (growth rate) (3.24)
τ = −(1− α)A+ (1 + χη)c̄w∆φ(κ), (capital tax rate) (3.25)
g = χηc̄w∆φ(κ), (public abatement) (3.26)
cw = c̄w∆φ(κ), (consumption) (3.27)
where the parameter κ and the consumption-capital ratio c̄w at zero mobility
(φ = 0) are denoted as
c̄w :=
εδ − (1− σ)(A− ρ)
κ
and κ := 1− (1 + χη)(1− σ).
The following lemma states that this model requires two inequalities for posi-
tive growth rate and bounded utility respectively.
20The original solutions for the growth rate γ, the capital tax rate τ , and the ratio of







τ = −(1− α)A+ (1+χη)(δ−(1−σ)(A−ρ)/ε)φ+(1−(1+χη)(1−σ))/ε ,




from eqs. (3.11), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), and (3.23).
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Lemma 3.3.2. Suppose this endogenous growth model satisfy the following
two inequalities:
A > εδ(1 + χη) + ρ and σ > 1− εδ
A− ρ
. (3.28)
Then (i) A−ρ > 0 and κ > 0, and in turn, (ii) the sustainability and transver-
sality conditions are satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The next thing we do is to investigate the impact of an increase in cap-
ital mobility on regional growth and environment. Differentiating the growth
rate γ in eq. (3.24) and the abatement-capital ratio g in eq. (3.26) with respect
to the parameter φ of capital mobility yields
dγ
dφ











since ∆ is decreasing in φ by Definition 1. Thus, the growth rate γ is pos-
itively related to φ while the abatement-capital ratio g is negatively related
to φ. Moreover, the capital tax rate τ becomes negative in eq. (3.25) and
the abatement-capital ratio g is zero in eq. (3.26), as the stock of capital is





[−(1− α)A+ (1 + χη)c̄w∆φ(κ)]






χηc̄w∆(φ, κ) = χηc̄w∆∞(κ) = 0.
The increased capital mobility gradually reduces the capital tax rate. Note
that each local economy has an infinite amount of pollution at g = 0. Even
if it positively affects the growth of local workers’ consumption, the capital
mobility gives a negative effect on local environment. Hence the increase in
capital mobility generates a trade-off between a higher growth rate and a lower
environmental quality to local jurisdictions.
To investigate the effect of increased capital mobility on the welfare of

























γ for σ = 1.
(3.29)
Plugging the growth rate (3.24), the abatement-capital ratio (3.26), and
the consumption-capital ratio (3.27) into eq. (3.29) gives the present value of
















= −((1− σ)W̄ + 1/δ)(1 + χη)ε
2
κ
· φ∆φ(1)2∆φ(κ)1−κ < 0.
The life-time welfare of workers is decreasing in capital mobility. The results
are summarized formally in
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Proposition 3.3.3 (full set of local policies). Suppose that the capital mobility
φ is increased. Then the growth rate γ increases, but the abatement-capital
ratio g decreases in each local jurisdiction. Moreover, the capital tax rate τ
becomes negative, and the deterioration of the environment is complete with the
perfect mobility of capital. The increased capital mobility reduces the residents’
welfare W .
“Tax importing” dominates the growth effect as the capital stock be-
comes more mobile. Even though it provides local jurisdictions with a higher
growth rate, the increased capital mobility transfers the burden of pollution
abatement from capitalists to workers in each jurisdiction. The higher capi-
tal mobility prevents the jurisdiction from taxing on capital, and it reinforces
their “race to the bottom” in the environmental standards.
3.4 Federal interventions
If the federation does not intervene in the local setting, an increase in
capital mobility gradually degrades local environments and reduces the res-
idents’ welfare. Hence, the next two subsections explore alternative federal
policies that keep the residents’ welfare at a higher level against the increased
mobility of capital.
3.4.1 Uniform environmental standard
The competing jurisdictions with no federal mediation suffer from lower
environmental quality as the stock of capital gets more mobile. To save the
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regional environments from deterioration, a federation has an incentive to set a
uniform environmental standard for the local jurisdictions. Hence this subsec-
tion examines how a higher level of government sets the uniform standard for
lower levels of government. At the beginning of time, the federal government
considers a particular amount of pollution for local environments such that
Pf = Pj for all j and any t. Then the uniform environmental standard can be











Suppose the federal government gives an environmental guideline ζ to the
local governments. Then each jurisdiction sets a capital tax rate as its own
policy instrument. Thus backward induction characterizes an optimal federal
standard and local equilibrium outcomes. Regarding the uniform standard as
given, the representative worker first sets a capital tax rate in each jurisdiction.
Then, subject to this local outcomes, the federal authority chooses a level of
environmental standard to maximize local workers’ welfare. That is, this two-
stage problem endogenously determines the uniform environmental standard
in the model.
Now, a representative worker as a median voter in each jurisdiction j
chooses a time path of capital tax rate to optimize his life-time utility (3.9),
subject to the flow budget constraint (3.11), the accumulation of mobile cap-
ital (3.8), and the federal uniform environmental standard (3.31), given an
amount of capital stock K (0) in his jurisdiction at the beginning of the time.
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Therefore, this maximization problem reads the current-value Hamiltonian:
Hw(τj, Kj, µj) = U(((1− α)A+ τj − ζ)Kj, ζ−χ)
+ µj((1/ε)(αA− τj − ρ)Kj + φ(αA− τj − rf )ψ(Kj, Kf )). (3.32)
Appendix B.1 derives as local outcomes the growth rate, the capital tax rate,












εδ − (1− σ)(A− ρ− ζ)
εφ+ σ
> 0. (3.35)
The federal authority then chooses an abatement-capital ratio ζ to maximize
the integrated life-time utility (3.29) subject to local outcomes in eqs. (3.33),





(W (1− σ) + 1/δ)κ








where W (1−σ)+1/δ = K(0)1−σc1−σw P−η(1−σ)/(δ−γ(1−σ)) is a positive term.
Since the left multiplier is positive in eq. (3.36), the optimal uniform standard
ζ∗ of environmental quality is given as
ζ∗ = χηc̄w. (public abatement). (3.37)
which is not related to a positive capital mobility φ. Plugging eq. (3.37) into
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eqs. (3.33), (3.34), and (3.35) gives the equilibrium local outcomes
γ(ζ∗) =
A− ρ− c̄w(∆φ(σ) + χη)
ε
, (growth rate) (3.38)
τ(ζ∗) = −(1− α)A+ c̄w(∆φ(σ) + χη), (capital tax rate) (3.39)
cw(ζ
∗) = c̄w∆φ(σ), (consumption) (3.40)
where the superscript ∗ indicates that the uniform standard is at the optimal
level. To examine how this optimal uniform standard changes the residents’
welfare, the substitution of eqs. (3.37), (3.38), and (3.40) into eq. (3.29) eval-













at the optimal level of environmental standard. Thus,
Proposition 3.4.1 (uniform environmental standard). Suppose that the mo-
bility of capital stock is positive, φ ∈ (0,∞). Then each local jurisdiction has
(i) a lower growth rate γ(ζ∗) and (ii) a higher abatement-capital ratio ζ∗ that
is independent of φ under the optimal uniform environmental standard ζ∗ than
under no federal intervention. The federal uniform standard improves (iii) the
local residents’ welfare W (ζ∗) better for σ 6= 1 or equal for σ = 1. If the mobil-
ity of capital stock is zero, φ = 0, then all the local outcomes and welfare level
under the optimal uniform environmental standard are the same as under no
federal intervention.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Eq. (3.37) states that the optimal uniform environmental standard is inde-
pendent of any capital mobility φ ∈ [0,∞). The optimal uniform standard
preserves the regional environments at the same level as the stock of capital
is perfectly immobile (φ = 0). Given a level of capital mobility, the consump-
tion growth rate is relatively lower in eq. (3.38). However, the welfare of local
residents is improved under the uniform environmental standard, since the
standard saves local environments from degradation by a higher mobility of
capital stock (i.e. severe competition).
3.4.2 Requirement of lump sum transfer (or tax)
Section 3 observes a reduction in the consumption level of local res-
idents relatively to the amount of capital invested in a jurisdiction, if the
capital mobility increases. In this case, the federal government may imposes a
requirement of lump sum transfer (or tax) in a redistributive objective. Then
local jurisdictions should use the capital tax as a second best, to finance their
public abatement activities. According to the local public finance literature,
the local environment as a public good might be under-provided in this case.21
This subsection investigates how the federal restriction on lump sum transfer
(or tax) provides the regional environment in this context. The federation
is assumed to require a fixed ratio of lump sum transfer to localities at the
beginning of the time. This federal requirement can then be defined by the
21See this result in Oates and Schwab (1988).
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To derive the optimal requirement of lump sum transfer, backward induction
is utilized again in the same way as in the previous subsection. Instead of eq.
(3.11), the budget constraint of workers then becomes
Cwj = ((1− α)A+ ξ)Kj. (3.43)
A representative worker (as a median voter) maximizes his life-time
welfare (3.9) subject to the above budget constraint (3.43), and the accumu-
lation of capital stock in eq. (3.8) by choosing a time path of capital tax rate,
given K(0) as an initial capital amount in the jurisdiction. The current-value
Hamiltonian for this optimization is
Hw(τj, Kj, µj) = U(((1− α)A+ ξ)Kj, (τj − ξ)−χ)
+ µj((1/ε)(αA− τj − ρ)Kj + φ(αA− τj − rf )ψ(Kj, Kf )). (3.44)

















which optimally adjust to any federal transfer requirement ξ. Then the fed-
eration chooses ξ to optimize the integrated life-time utility (3.29) subject to
regional outcomes in eqs. (3.45), (3.46), and (3.47). Appendix B.2 derives the




(W (1− σ) + 1/δ)κ








Note that the left multiplier is positive in eq. (3.48). Thus, the optimal federal
requirement ξ∗ of lump sum transfer is given as
ξ∗ = −(1− α)A+ c̄w (3.49)
which, in turn, leads to the consumption-capital ratio
cw(ξ
∗) = c̄w (consumption) (3.50)
by the budget constraint in eq. (3.43). The optimal consumption-capital ratio
cw(ξ
∗) does not depend on any positive capital mobility φ. Substituting eq.
(3.49) into the local outcomes in eqs. (3.45), (3.46), and (3.47) yields equilib-
rium local outcomes
γ(ξ∗) =
A− ρ− c̄w(1 + χη∆φ(ι))
ε
, (growth rate) (3.51)
τ(ξ∗) = −(1− α)A+ c̄w(1 + χη∆φ(ι)), (capital tax rate) (3.52)
g(ξ∗) = χηc̄w∆φ(ι), (public abatement) (3.53)
where ι := 1−χη(1−σ). To investigate how the optimal federal requirement ξ∗
alters the residents’ welfare, the substitution of eqs. (3.50), (3.51), and (3.53)
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at the optimal level of federal requirement ξ∗. Hence,
Proposition 3.4.2 (requirement of lump sum transfer). Suppose that the mo-
bility of capital stock is positive, φ ∈ (0,∞). Then each local jurisdiction has
(i) a lower growth rate γ(ξ∗) and (ii) a higher, equal, or lower abatement-capital
ratio g(ξ∗) for σ < 1, σ = 1, or σ > 1 under the optimal requirement of lump
sum transfer ξ∗ than under no federal intervention. The federal requirement
improves (iii) the local residents’ welfare W (ξ∗) better for σ 6= 1 or equal for
σ = 1. If the mobility of capital stock is zero, φ = 0, then all the local outcomes
and welfare level under the optimal requirement of lump sum transfer are the
same as under no federal intervention.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Eq. (3.50) implies that the consumption relative to stock of capital is indepen-
dent of any capital mobility φ ∈ (0,∞). The optimal requirement keeps the
consumption-capital ratio in the same level as the capital stock is perfectly
immobile (φ = 0). The consumption growth rate is relatively lower in eq.
(3.51), since the federal requirement of lump sum transfer (or tax) enforces
the local jurisdictions to tax on mobile capital. The regional environment is
more degraded for φ ∈ (0,∞), if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
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is less than one (σ > 1). In contrast to this prediction as in static models
with interjurisdictional competition, we have the opposite result as well, if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one (σ < 1). That is,
the regional environment as public good is over-provided even with the fed-
eral restriction on lump sum transfer (or tax). The local residents’ welfare
is enhanced under the requirement of lump sum transfer (or tax), since the
requirement achieves the redistributive object against the increasing capital
mobility (i.e. severe competition).
To complete welfare comparison among three different policy systems,
I examine welfare difference between under uniform standard of environmental
quality and requirement of lump sum transfer (or tax).
Corollary 3.4.3. Suppose that the mobility of capital stock is positive, φ ∈
(0,∞). Then the optimal requirement of lump sum transfer ξ∗ makes the
residents’ welfare W (ξ∗) better for χη < 1, equal for χη = 1, or worse for χη
> 1 than the optimal uniform environmental standard ζ∗. If the mobility of
capital stock is zero, φ = 0, then the welfare level under the optimal requirement
of lump sum transfer is the same as under the optimal uniform standard of
environmental quality.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using Propositions 3.4.1 – 3.4.2 and Corollary 3.4.3, Table 3.1 sum-
marizes welfare comparison among three alternative policy structures. If
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the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is one (σ = 1), the residents in
each jurisdiction have the same level of welfare among all three policy sys-
tems, and the welfare level does not depend on any positive level of mobility
(W = W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗) = W̄ ). Thus, any federal intervention has no effect
on the residents’ welfare. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is not
one (σ 6= 1), either one of two federal interventions enhances the welfare level
for any positive level of capital mobility, however. If σ 6= 1 and χη = 1, both
of the interventions are equally effective. If σ 6= 1 and χη > 1, the uniform
environmental standards should be preferred to the requirement of lump sum
transfer (or tax). This is the case where the residents’ environmental concern
is relatively higher or the regional environment is relatively more polluted by
the capital stock induced in the jurisdiction. On the other case (σ 6= 1 and
χη < 1), the lump sum transfer (or tax) requirement is more effective than the
uniform standard. Since the increased capital mobility transfers the burden of
pollution abatement to each jurisdiction, the federal intervention is necessary
to save the jurisdictions.
Table 3.1: Welfare Comparison among Three Alternative Policy Structures
χη < 1 χη = 1 χη > 1
σ = 1 W = W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗) W = W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗) W = W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗)
σ 6= 1 W < W (ζ∗) < W (ξ∗) W < W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗) W < W (ζ∗) > W (ξ∗)
a
σ: the inverse of intertemporal substitution
η the weight for pollution
χ: the positive elasticity of pollution with respect to the capital-abatement ratio.
b
W : welfare with full set of local policies
W (ζ∗): welfare under a uniform environmental standard
W (ξ∗): welfare under a federal requirement of revenue transfer
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3.5 Conclusion
The paper identifies that an increase in capital mobility provides local
jurisdictions with a higher growth rate. Since the increasing mobility of cap-
ital strengthens the jurisdictions to set a lower capital tax rate, the stock of
capital can rapidly accumulate in the jurisdictions. Although it has a positive
effect on the growth rate, the increase in capital mobility degrades regional
environments. This finding supports the hypothesis of “race to the bottom”
in environmental standards. Thus, the capital mobility presents a trade-off
between growth rate and environmental quality. If the stock of capital is rel-
atively more mobile, each jurisdiction cannot avoid to collect relatively less
revenue from capital stock. To finance the local public expenditure on pollu-
tion abatement, the jurisdiction relies relatively more on the lump sum tax (or
relatively less on the lump sum transfer). That is, each jurisdiction “imports
tax” within its regional boundary. The increasing capital mobility transfers
the burden of public funds from capitalists to local residents. Therefore, both
of the federal interventions are meaningful and could perform key roles in
reality.
I do not consider the jurisdictions where the workers as actual residents
are heterogenous as in Oates and Schwab (1988). The impact of increasing
capital mobility would be different according to alternative outcome from ma-
jority voting. To investigate this, one can easily extend this model, however.
A majority of non-wage workers could be an alternative against the increasing
mobility of capital. This outcome might reduce the negative effects on regional
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environments and welfare, since the non-wage workers depend relatively less
on the amount of capital induced in the jurisdiction. But, the impact of in-
creasing capital mobility is somewhat negative in the majority of wage workers.
The income source of wage workers is very related to the level of capital stock.
Thus the wage workers would vote for even lower capital tax rates as the stock





Appendix of Chapter 1
A.1 Expenditure function approach
From the maximization problem of the individual taxpayer, we can fig-
ure out demand functions for C1 and C2, supply function for L, and tax evaded
E as the optimal choices. Since we derive the first order conditions in eqs. (1.4)
- (1.7) in section 3 and reformulate the two budget constraints with the virtual
income Z (regarded as exogenously given) in section 4, the optimal choice func-
tions C1, C2, L and E can have as their arguments the net wage rate (1−m)w,
audit rate p, penalty rate π, publicly supplied nonmarket good G, and transfer
Z. Thus, the indirect expected utility function Ū∗ can be constructed as Ū∗ =
Ū∗ ((1−m)w, p, π,G, Z) ≡ (1 − p)U(C1 (·) , V (·) , G) + pU(C2 (·) , V (·) , G)
where the dot represents the vector of the arguments mentioned above. By
using the Envelope Theorem, we have the partial derivatives of Ū∗ with respect
to each of the parameters (1−m)w, p, π, and Z as follows:
Ū∗(1−m)w = (λ1 + λ2)L, (A.1)
Ū∗p = U(C2, V,G)− U(C1, V,G) ≤ 0, (A.2)
Ū∗π = −λ2E, (A.3)
Ū∗Z = λ1 + λ2. (A.4)
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In order to develop the relationship between the uncompensated and
compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to each of the net wage
rate (1 − m)w, the audit rate p and fine rate θ, we exploit the expenditure
function approach. Now, the uncompensated and compensated labor sup-
ply are equal at the optimum: L
(
(1−m)w, p, π,G, Z
(





(1−m)w, p, π,G, Ū∗
)
. Partially differentiate this identity to get three
Slutsky equations that are associated with the net wage rate (1 − m)w, the
probability rate p and the penalty rate π:
L(1−m)w + LZZ(1−m)w = L
c
(1−m)w, (A.5)
Lp + LZZp = L
c
p, (A.6)
Lπ + LZZπ = L
c
π. (A.7)
Since Z can be found by inverting the indirect utility function Ū∗, it is easy to
derive the partial derivatives of the virtual income Z from eqs. (A.1) - (A.4)



















The first-order Taylor expansion is used in order to approximate the marginal
utility function U (C1, V,G) to U (C2, V,G) + UC (C2, V,G) (C1 − C2) in eq.
(A.9). Insert eqs. (A.8) - (A.10) into three Slutsky equations above, and then
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multiply the results by (1−m)w/L, P/L and θ/L respectively to get three
relationship between the uncompensated and compensated elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the net wage, audit, and fine rate:













In eqs. (A.11) - (A.13), the superscript c indicates “compensated,” while no
superscript implies “uncompensated.” The parameters η, εp, and εθ denote
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage, audit, and fine rate




























Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. (i). Assume that eq. (3.28) are satisfied. Then
A− ρ > ε(1 +χη)δ > 0. The parameter κ is positive for σ ≥ 1. If σ < 1, then
κ = 1− (1 + χη)(1− σ) = 1− ε(1 + χη)δ
A− ρ
· (A− ρ)(1− σ)
εδ
> 0,
since 0 < εδ(1+χη)/(A−ρ) < 1 and 0 < (A−ρ)(1−σ)/εδ < 1 from rearranging
eq. (3.28). (ii). The growth rate is positive for arbitrary φ ∈ [0,∞):
γ =
A− ρ− (1 + χη)c̄w∆φ(κ)
ε
=
ε(A− ρ)φ+ A− ρ− εδ(1 + χη)
ε(εφ+ κ)
> 0,
since A− ρ > 0 and A− ρ− εδ(1 +χη) > 0 from using (i) and rearranging the
first inequality in eq. (3.28). The transversality condition (3.19) is satisfied for




















and the term UC(0)εK(0)/(εφ+ 1) is positive and finite.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. (i). The difference of growth rates between
under no federal intervention and under the optimal uniform environmental
standard is







> 0 if φ > 0 and
= 0 if φ = 0.
(ii). The difference of abatement-capital ratios between under no federal inter-
vention and under the optimal uniform environmental standard is




< 0 if φ > 0, and
= 0 if φ = 0.
(iii). The difference of welfare between under no federal intervention and under
the optimal uniform environmental standard is
W −W (ζ∗) = ((1− σ)W̄ + 1/δ)
1− σ
·∆φ(1)[∆φ(κ)−κ −∆φ(σ)−σ].
Note that κ − σ = −χη(1 − σ). If σ = 1, then W = W (ζ∗) since κ = σ and,
thus, ∆φ(κ)
−κ = ∆φ(σ)
−σ for any φ ≥ 0. Suppose that σ < 1 (or σ > 1).





κ < σ (or κ > σ) for any φ ≥ 0 from Definition 3.3.1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.2. First, I prove that the parameter ι is positive.
If σ ≥ 1, then ι = 1− χη(1− σ) > 0. Suppose that σ < 1. Since κ = 1− (1 +
χη)(1−σ) > 0 by Lemma 1 and 1−σ > 0, we have that 0 < (1+χη)(1−σ) < 1.
Then ι = 1 − χη(1 − σ) = 1 − (χη/(1 + χη))(1 + χη)(1 − σ) > 0. (i). The
difference of growth rates between under no federal intervention and under the
optimal requirement of lump sum transfer is







> 0 if φ > 0, and
= 0 if φ = 0.
(ii). The difference of abatement-capital ratios between under no federal inter-
vention and the optimal requirement of lump sum transfer is
g − g(ξ∗) = χηc̄w(∆φ(κ)−∆φ(ι))
= −(1− σ) · χηc̄wε
κι
· φ∆φ(κ)∆φ(ι)
<,=, or > 0 for σ <,=, or > 1 when φ > 0 and
= 0 when φ = 0.
(iii). The difference of welfare levels between under no federal intervention and
under the optimal requirement of lump sum transfer is
W −W (ξ∗) = ((1− σ)W̄ + 1/δ)
1− σ
·∆(φ, 1)[∆φ(κ)−κ −∆φ(ι)−ι].
If φ = 0, then W = W (ξ∗). Suppose that φ > 0. Note that κ− ι = −(1− σ).









−ι) with κ < ι or (κ > ι) for φ > 0
from Definition 3.3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3. The difference of welfare levels between under
the optimal uniform standard of environmental quality and under the optimal
requirement of lump sum transfer is
W (ζ∗)−W (ξ∗) = ((1− σ)W̄ + 1/δ)
1− σ
·∆φ(1)[∆φ(σ)−σ −∆φ(ι)−ι].
Note that σ− ι = −(1−χη)(1− σ). If χη = 1 or σ = 1, then W (ζ∗) = W (ξ∗)
since σ = ι, and thus, ∆φ(σ)
−σ = ∆φ(ι)
−ι for φ ∈ (0,∞). Suppose that χη < 1





−ι) for φ ∈ (0,∞) by Definition
3.3.1. Suppose that χη > 1 and σ < 1 (or σ > 1). Then W (ζ∗) > W (ξ∗) since





φ ∈ (0,∞) by Definition 3.3.1. Therefore, the comparison of two welfare is
not independent of σ 6= 1.
B.2 Derivations
B.2.1 Derivation of optimal uniform environmental standard
Local outcomes for a given uniform standard
Differentiating the current-value Hamiltonian (3.32) with respect to the
capital tax rate τ , the sock of capital K, and the shadow price of capital µ,
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and then substituting the ex-post equilibrium conditions (3.13) and (3.14), we
take the following first-order conditions:
UC = µ(1/ε+ φ)K, (B.1)
((1− α)A+ τ − ζ)UC − µ(αA− τ − ρ)/ε = δµ− µ̇, (B.2)
K̇ = (1/ε)(αA− τ − ρ)K. (B.3)
Differentiating eq. (B.1) with respect to time, and then replacing this result
and eq. (B.1) into eq. (B.2), we get
Ċw
Cw
= (((1− α)A+ τ − ζ)(1/ε+ φ) + (αA− τ − ρ)/ε− δ)/σ, (B.4)
which is the Keynes-Ramsey rule that describes the optimal saving-investment
path for the capital stock under a uniform standard.
The optimal uniform standard
The total differentiation of the integrated life-time utility function (3.29)
gives








δ − γ(1− σ)
)
. (B.5)
Differentiating totally the growth rate γ(ζ) in eq. (3.33), the consumption-
capital ratio cw(ζ) in eq. (3.35), and the pollution function (3.1), we have
dγ
δ − γ(1− σ)
= − (1/ε)dζ














By plugging eqs. (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8) into eq. (B.5), we arrive at the first-
order condition (3.36) for the uniform standard ζ of environmental quality.
B.2.2 Derivation of optimal requirement of lump sum transfer (or
tax)
Local outcomes for a given requirement
Differentiating the current-value Hamiltonian (3.44) with respect to the
capital tax rate τ , the capital stock K, and the shadow price of capital µ, and
then replacing the ex-post equilibrium conditions in eqs. (3.13) and (3.14), we
get the first-order conditions as
UP = −µ(1/ε+ φ)Kχ(τ − ξ)χ+1, (B.9)
((1− α)A+ ξ)UC + µ(αA− τ − ρ)/ε = δµ− µ̇, (B.10)
K̇ = (1/ε)(αA− τ − ρ)K. (B.11)
Differentiating eq. (B.9) with respect to time and plugging the derivative and





(1/ε+ φ)(τ − ξ)
χη




which is the Keynes-Ramsey rule that implies the optimal saving-investment
path for the stock of capital under a federal requirement of transfer.
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The optimal requirement
Differentiating totally the consumption-capital ratio cw(ξ) in eq. (3.43),
the growth rate γ(ξ) in eq. (3.45), the abatement-capital ratio g(ξ) in eq. (3.47),























Hence, we arrive at eq. (3.48) by substituting eq. (B.15) into eqs. (B.14) and
(B.16), and then plugging two results and eq. (B.13) into eq. (B.5).
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